A Visual Guide to the Financial Crisis

A Visual Guide to the Financial Crisis by WallStats.com on 11/13/2008

from http://blog.mint.com/blog/finance-core/a-visual-guide-to-the-financial-crisis/


Almost overnight, the talking heads went from perpetuating the euphoria of investors to rushing to pronounce the economy dead. Last year, when lenders started dropping like flies as foreclosures rose and margins were called, the problems of Wall Street became more and more apparent, and lending guidelines were tightened to the point that many individuals were stuck in their time-bomb loans, and thus began a vicious cycle. But what led to this? Here is a visual guide to help you understand the events leading up to the bailout.

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books: Transaction cost

1

Transaction Cost Approach To Agricultural Contracts
c1996
1
2

Transaction Cost Economics And Beyond
c1996
1
3

Transaction Cost Economics And Beyond Towards A New Economics Of The Firm

2
4

Transaction Cost Economics Recent Developments
c1997
1
5

Transaction Cost Economics The Process Of Theory Development
2005
1
6

Transaction Costs

3
7

Transaction Costs And Integer Constraints
2005
1
8

Transaction Costs And The New Information Economy
c2005
1
9

Transaction Costs And Their Impact On The Market For Bioprospecting
c2005
1
10

Transaction Costs And Trade Between Multinational Corporations A Study Of Offshore Oil Production
1990
1
11

Transaction Costs In An Emerging Market The Case Of Indonesia
1996
1
12

Transaction Costs In Decentralized Rural Financial Markets
1995
1
13

Transaction Costs In Portfolio Management And Derivative Pricing
c1999
1
14

Transaction Costs In The Transportation Sector And Infrastructure In North America Exploring Harmonization Of Standards
2007
1
15

Transaction Costs Market Failures Competitiveness And The State
c1995
1
16

Transaction Costs Markets And Hierarchies
1993
1
17

Transaction Costs Of Debt Conversions

2
18

Transaction Costs Of Group And Individual Lending And Rural Financial Market Access The Case Of Poverty Oriented Microfinance
2002
1

Books: Transaction cost economics

1Transaction Cost Approach To Agricultural Contracts c1996 1
2 Transaction Cost Economics And Beyond c1996 1
3 Transaction Cost Economics And Beyond Towards A New Economics Of The Firm 2
4 Transaction Cost Economics Recent Developments c1997 1

5 Transaction Cost Economics The Process Of Theory Development 2005 1
6 Transaction Costs 3
7 Transaction Costs And Integer Constraints 2005
1
8

Transaction Costs And The New Information Economy
c2005
1
9

Transaction Costs And Their Impact On The Market For Bioprospecting
c2005
1
10 Transaction Costs And Trade Between Multinational Corporations A Study Of Offshore Oil Production 1990 1
11 Transaction Costs In An Emerging Market The Case Of Indonesia 1996 1
12 Transaction Costs In Decentralized Rural Financial Markets 1995 1
13 Transaction Costs In Portfolio Management And Derivative Pricing c1999 1
14 Transaction Costs In The Transportation Sector And Infrastructure In North America Exploring Harmonization Of Standards 2007 1
15

Transaction Costs Market Failures Competitiveness And The State
c1995
1
16

Transaction Costs Markets And Hierarchies
1993
1
17

Transaction Costs Of Debt Conversions

2
18

Transaction Costs Of Group And Individual Lending And Rural Financial Market Access The Case Of Poverty Oriented Microfinance
2002
1

pn: Coase 1937 II: Substitution based on Transaction cost

Coase, 1937, Part II, p390

The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.

The most obvious cost of " organising" production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are. This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and

Naturally, a point must be reached where the costsof organising an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction inthe open market, or, to the costs of organising by anotherentrepreneur.

Secondly, it may be that as the transactionswhich are organised increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the factors of production. Again, a point must be reached wlhere the loss through the waste of resources is equal to the marketingcosts of the exchange transaction in the open market orto the loss if the transaction was organised by anotherentrepreneur.

Finally, the supply price of one or more of the factors of production may rise, because the " otheradvantages " of a small firm are greater than those of alarge firm.' Of course, the actual point where the expansionof the firm ceases might be determined by a combination of the factors mentioned above. The first two reasons given most probably correspond to the economists' phrase of " diminishing returns to management."

The point has been made in the previous paragraph thata firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising anextra transactioni within the firm become equal to the costsof carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchangeon the open market or the costs of organising in anotherfirm. But if the firm stops its expansion at a point below

pn: coase,1937 I :The substitutive relationship of Market and firm

Coase, 1937, p386 The substitutive relationship of Market and firm

It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin.

Coase, 1937, p387 about economic system

Sir Arthur Salter. " The normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive." An economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by the price mechanism and society becomes not an organisation but an organism.

Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.

Sir Arthur Salter's description, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. Within a firm, the description does not fit at all.

Marshall introduces organisation as a fourth factor of production; J. B. Clark gives the co-ordinating function to the entrepreneur; Professor Knight introduces managers who co-ordinate. As D. H. Robertson points out, we find "islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk."' But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination will be done by the price mechanism,why is such organisation necessary ? Why are there these " islands of conscious power " ?

Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.

Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production.

It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production.

Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organisation at all, well might we ask, why is there any organisation ?

Of course, the degree to which the price mechanism is superseded varies greatly.

In a department store
In the Lancashire cotton industry


This co-ordination of the various factors of production is, however, normally carried out without the intervention of the price mechanism. As is evident, the amount of "vertical " integration, involving as it does the supersession of the price mechanism, varies greatly from industry to industry and from firm to firm.

It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.

The purpose of this paper is to bridge what appears to be a gap in economic theory between the assumption (made for some purposes) that resources are allocated by means of the price mechanism and the assumption (made for other purposes) that this allocation is dependent on the entrepreneur-co-ordinator. We have to explain the basis on which, in practice, this choice between alternatives is effected.

Baker.Gibbons:2007 ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS

Economics 2670 and 14.282
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS
Spring 2007
George Baker and Robert Gibbons
Syllabus Version: January 27, 2007

come from: http://web.mit.edu/14.282/www/syll.html

Overview
For Spring 2007, the doctoral courses in organizational economics usually taught at Harvard and MIT (Econ 2670 and 14.282, respectively) will be combined and taught at MIT (Mondays and Wednesdays, 10:30-12:00, in E51-361) by George Baker and Bob Gibbons. For Spring 2008, these courses will again be combined, but this time at Harvard and taught by Oliver Hart and Gibbons.
The course will introduce the classic papers and some recent research in organizational economics. The material will be organized into the following modules:

Module 0: Introduction
Module 1: The Boundary of the Firm
Module 2: Decision-Making in Organizations
Module 3: Employment
Module 4: Structures and Processes
Module 5: Beyond Firms
Each class session will cover only a few leading papers. Further readings organized into similar modules can be found at http://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/index.html.
Deliverables
We feel it is essential that students be prepared to discuss the readings in class. For this reason, each class session will include 2 or 3 required articles (or one required case study). Students are expected to come to class with a one-page write-up of one of the articles (or the one case) required for that day. An article write-up should cover the paper’s motivation, methods, and results. A case write-up should briefly describe the setting and issues in the case (and, if relevant, propose a decision to be taken) and then discuss in more detail whether the theories and evidence in the course are relevant to the case. We will encourage discussion during each class, building from students’ write-ups.
In addition to the one-page write-ups, there will be a required paper on any topic of interest to you relating to the material in the course. This could be a theoretical or empirical piece. We obviously do not expect you to produce a full (publishable) paper for this assignment, but we would be happy with an insightful, analytical literature review in a particular area or a well thought-out research design on some topic that you might want to work more on in the future. You should plan to discuss your paper ideas with us before mid-April to get our approval. This paper will be due on May 21st.
Grading will be 30% on the one-page write-ups, 30% on class participation, and 40% on the final paper.
Office Hours
We will be available by appointment. Please send us an email to set up a time: gbaker@hbs.edu or rgibbons@mit.edu.
Prerequisites
First-year microeconomics (Economics 2010ab or 14.121-4) and either contract theory (Economics 2060 or 14.281) or familiarity and comfort with the following readings.
Gibbons, Robert. 2005a. “Incentives Between Firms (and Within).” Management Science 51: 2-17 (Sections 2-4).
Gibbons, Robert. 2005b. “Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 58: 202-247 (Section 2).

Module 0: Introduction (1 session)


Feb. 7: What is an organization? What is organizational economics?
* Coase, Ronald. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 4: 386-405.
* Williamson, Oliver 1971. “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Consideration” American Economic Review, 61: 112-23.
* Alchian, Armen and Harold Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review, 62: 316-25.


Module 1: The Boundary of the Firm (7 sessions)
Background: Gibbons, Robert. 2005. “Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 58: 202-247 (Sections 1-3).

Feb. 12: Classic Theories (BG)
Simon, Herbert. 1951. “A Formal Theory Model of the Employment Relationship.” Econometrica 19: 293-305.
Williamson, Oliver 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York, NY: Free Press.
* Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart. 1986. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy, 94: 4, 691-719.
Hart, Oliver. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Chapter 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom. 1994. “The Firm as an Incentive System.” American Economic Review 84:4, 972-91.
* Holmstrom, Bengt. 1999. “The Firm as a Subeconomy.” Journal of Law Economics and Organizations 15: 74-102.
Klein, Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and Economics 21:297-326.
* Williamson, Oliver. 1979. “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics 22: 233-61.

Feb. 14: Classic Evidence (GB)

* Monteverde, Kirk, and David Teece. 1982. “Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry.” Bell Journal of Economics 13: 206-12.
* Masten, Scott. 1984. “The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry.” Journal of Law and Economics 27: 403-17.
Joskow, Paul. 1985. “Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generation Plants.” Journal of Law Economics and Organizations 1: 33-80.
Whinston, Michael. 2003. “On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration.” Journal of Law Economics and Organizations 19: 1-23.

Feb. 21: Recent Evidence (GB)
Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard. 2003. “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information.” American Economic Review 93: 551-72.
* Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard. 2004. “Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in US Trucking.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 1443 – 1479.
* Woodruff, Christopher. 2002. “Non-contractible Investment and Vertical Integration in the Mexican Footwear Industry.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 20: 1197-1224.
Azoulay, Pierre. 2004. “Capturing Knowledge Within and Across Firm Boundaries: Evidence from Clinical Development.” American Economic Review, 94(5), pp. 1591-1612.

Feb. 26: Relational Contracting and Firm Boundaries (BG)
Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 2002. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 39-84.
* Weber, Katherine Seger, and Linda Hill. 1995. “Rudi Gassner and the Executive Committee of BMG International (A).” Harvard Business School Case #9-494-055.
Klein, Benjamin and Kevin M. Murphy. 1997. “Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement.” American Economic Review 87: 415-20.

Feb. 28: Formal and Relational Contracting – Theory (BG)
* Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole. 1994. “On the Management of Innovation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 1185-1207.
* Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis. 2001. “Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts.” RAND Journal of Economics, 32:3, 287-307.
Bhattacharyya, Sugato and Francine Lafontaine. 1995. “Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts.” Rand Journal of Economics 26: 761-81
Klein, Benjamin and Kevin M. Murphy. 1988. “Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms.” Journal of Law and Economics 31: 265-97.
Klein, Benjamin. 1996. “Why Hold-ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships.” Economic Inquiry 34: 444-63.
Klein, Benjamin. 2000. “The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships.” Revue D’Économie Industrielle 92: 67-80
Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy. 2006. “Contracting for Control.” Unpublished manuscript, USC.



Mar. 5: Formal and Relational Contracting – Evidence (GB)
* Lerner, Josh and Robert Merges. 1998. “The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry.” Journal of Industrial Economics 46: 125-56.
* Arruñada, Benito, Luis Garicano, and Luis Vázquez. 2001. “Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17: 257-84.
* Corts, Kenneth and Jasjit Singh. 2004. “The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20: 230-60.
McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff. 1999. “Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 637-58.
Elfenbein, Daniel and Josh Lerner. 2003. “Ownership and control rights in Internet portal alliances, 1995-1999.” RAND Journal of Economics 34: 356-69.
Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn Shaw. 1999. “The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data.” Journal of Political Economy 107: 1041-80.
Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn Shaw. 2005. “Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising.” RAND Journal of Economics 36: 131-50.

Mar. 7: Hybrid Governance Structures (BG)
Richardson, George. 1972. “The Organisation of Industry.” Economic Journal 82: 883-96.
Blois, K. 1972. “Vertical Quasi-Integration.” Journal of Industrial Economics 20: 253-72.
Eccles, Robert. 1981. “The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2: 335-57.
Hennart, Jean-Francois. 1993. “Explaining the Swollen Middle: Why Most Transactions Are a Mix of ‘Market’ and ‘Hierarchy’.” Organization Science 4: 529-47.
Ménard, Claude. 1996. “On Clusters, Hybrids, and Other Strange Forms: The Case of the French Poultry Industry.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152: 154-83.
* McQuade, Krista and Benjamin Gomes-Casseres. 1992. “Xerox and Fuji Xerox.” Harvard Business School Case #9-391-156.


Module 2: Decision-Making in Organizations (4 sessions)

Background: Gibbons, Robert. 2003. “Team Theory, Garbage Cans, and Real Organizations: Some History and Prospects of Economic Research on Decision-Making in Organizations.” Industrial and Corporate Change 12: 753-87.

Mar. 12: Authority and Power (BG)
* Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole. 1997. “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy 105:1-29.
* Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1999. “Informal Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 56-73.
* Foss, Nicolai. 2003. “Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon Spaghetti Organization.” Organization Science 14: 331-49.
Rotemberg, Julio. 1993. “Power in Profit-Maximizing Organizations.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2:165-98.

Mar. 14: Politics and Influence (BG)
* Aguilar, Francis and Arvind Bhambri. 1983. “Johnson & Johnson (A), (B).” Harvard Business School Case #384-053 and -054.
March, James. 1962. “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition.” Journal of Politics 24:662-78.
Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. “Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights.” American Economic Review 82: 720-39.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales. 2000. “The Tyranny of Inequality.” Journal of Public Economics 76: 521-58.
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. 1988. “An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations.” American Journal of Sociology 94:S154-S179.
Rotemberg, Julio, and Garth Saloner. 1995. “Overt interfunctional conflict (and its reduction through business strategy).” Rand Journal of Economics 26:630-53.

Mar. 19: Culture and Leadership (GB)
* Kreps, David. 1990. “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.” In J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge University Press.
* Colin Camerer and Roberto Weber. (forthcoming). “Growing organizational culture in the laboratory.” In Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, eds. Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.
* Weber, Roberto. 2006. “Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups.” American Economic Review 96:1, 114-126.
Weber, R. Rottenstreich, Y., Camerer, C. and Knez, M. 2001. “The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games.” Organizational Science 12: 582-98.
Cremer, Jacques, Luis Garicano, Andrea Prat. 2006. “Language and the Theory of the Firm.” Forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:1.
Hermalin, Benjamin. 1998. “Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading By Example.” American Economic Review 88: 1188-1206.

Mar. 21: Interpersonal Authority (guest lecture by Eric Van den Steen)
* Van den Steen, Eric. 2005. “Too Motivated?” Unpublished manuscript, MIT.
* Van den Steen, Eric. 2006. “The Limits of Authority: Motivation vs. Coordination.” Unpublished manuscript, MIT.
* Van den Steen, Eric. 2006. “Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm.” Unpublished manuscript, MIT.
Marino, Anthony, Matsusaka, John and Zabojnik, Jan. 2006. “Disobedience and Authority.” Unpublished manuscript, USC.


SPRING BREAK


Module 3: Employment (6 sessions)

Background: Gibbons, Robert, and Michael Waldman. 1999. “Careers in Organizations: Theory and Evidence.” Chapter 36 in Volume 3B of O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, North Holland.

Apr. 2: Pay for Performance: Distortion (GB)

Lazear, Edward. 2000. “Performance Pay and Productivity.” American Economic Review 90: 1346-61.
Baker, George. 1992. “Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement.” Journal of Political Economy 100: 3, 598-614.
* Baker, George. 2002. “Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts.” Journal of Human Resources 37: 4, 728-751.
* Courty, Pascal, and Gerald Marschke. 2004. “An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives.” Journal of Labor Economics 22: 23-56.
* Oyer, Paul. 1998. "Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality." Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:149-85.

Apr. 4: Pay for Performance: Discretion (GB)
* Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1994. “Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:1125-56.
Che, Yeon-Koo, and Seung-Weon Yoo. 2001. “Optimal Incentives for Teams.” American Economic Review 91: 525-41.
Prendergast, Canice, and Robert Topel. 1996. “Favoritism in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy 104:958-78.
* Hayes, Rachel and Scott Schaefer. 2000. "Implicit contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance." RAND Journal of Economics 31: 273-93.

Apr. 9: Pay for Performance: Case Discussions (GB)
* Burtis, Andrew, and John Gabarro. 1996. “Brainard, Bennis & Farrell.” Harvard Business School Case #9-485-037.
* Stewart, James. 1993. “Taking the Dare.” The New Yorker, July 26, 1993: 34-39.
* Roy, Donald. 1952. “Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop.” American Journal of Sociology 57:427-42.

Apr. 11: Job Assignment, Skill Development, and Networks (BG)
* Waldman, Michael. 1984. “Job Assignment, Signaling, and Efficiency.” RAND Journal of Economics 15:255-87.
Brüderl, Josef, Andreas Diekmann, and Peter Preisendörfer. 1991. “Patterns of Intraorganizational Mobility: Tournament Models, Path Dependency, and Early Promotion Effects.” Social Science Research 20:197-216.
Chiappori, Pierre-André, Bernard Salanié, and Julie Valentin. 1999. “Early Starters versus Late Beginners.” Journal of Political Economy 107: 731-60.
* Prendergast, Canice. 1993. “The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:523-34.
Acemoglu, Daron, and J. Stephen Pischke. 1998. “Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:79-119.
Autor, David. 2001. “Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 1409-48.
* Podolny, Joel, and James Baron. 1997. “Resources and Relationships: Social Networks and Mobility in the Workplace.” American Sociological Review 62:673-93.
Fernandez, Roberto, and Nancy Weinberg. 1997. “Sifting and Sorting: Personal Contacts and Hiring in a Retail Bank.” American Sociological Review 62:883-902.
Fernandez, Roberto, Emilio Castilla, and Paul Moore. 1999. “Social Capital at Work: Networks and Employment at a Phone Center.” American Journal of Sociology 105: 1288-356.

Apr. 18: Employment Systems (BG)
Ichniowski, Casey, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi. 1997. “The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines.” American Economic Review 87:291-313.
Baron, James, and Michael Hannan. 2002. “Organizational Blueprints for Success in High-Tech Start-Ups: Lessons from the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies.” California Management Review 44: 8-36.
* Fast, Norman, and Norman Berg. 1975. “The Lincoln Electric Company.” Harvard Business School Case #376-028.
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. 1990. “The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization.” American Economic Review, 80: 511-28

Apr. 23: Careers in Organizations (GB)
* Baker, George, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom. 1994. “The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 109: 881-919.
* Baker, George, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom. 1994. “The Wage Policy of a Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 921-955.
Treble, John, Edwin van Gameren, Sarah Bridges, and Tim Barmby. 2001. “The internal economics of the firm: further evidence from personnel data.” Labour Economics 8: 531-52.
* Gibbons, Robert, and Michael Waldman. 1999. “A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside a Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 1321-58.
Lluis, Stéphanie. 2005. “The Role of Comparative Advantage and Learning in Wage Dynamics and Intrafirm Mobility: Evidence from Germany.” Journal of Labor Economics 23: 725-67.
Gibbons, Robert and Michael Waldman. 2006. “Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms.” Journal of Labor Economics 24: 59-107.


Module 4: Structures and Processes (5 sessions)


Apr. 25: Five Elemental Models of Hierarchy (BG)

Radner, Roy. 1992. “Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing.” Journal of Economic Literature 30: 1382-1415.
Radner, Roy. 1993. “The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing.” Econometrica 61: 1109-46.
Van Zandt, Timothy. 2003. “Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation.” Unpublished manuscript, INSEAD.
Calvo, Guillermo and Stanislaw Wellisz. 1978. “Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy 86: 943-52.
Calvo, Guillermo and Stanislaw Wellisz. 1979. “Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy 86: 943-52.
* Garicano, Luis. 2000. “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production.” Journal of Political Economy 108: 874-904.
* Hart, Oliver and John Moore. 2005. “On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization.” Journal of Political Economy 113: 675-702.

Apr. 30: Theory and Evidence on Structure (GB)
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales. 2001. “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 805-51.
* Rajan, Raghuram and Julie Wulf. 2006. “The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies.” Review of Economics and Statistics. 88: 759-773.
Garicano, Luis and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. 2006. “Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121: 1383-1435.
* Garicano, Luis and Tom Hubbard. 2006. “The Return to Knowledge Hierarchies.” Working Paper Chicago GSB.

May 2: Theory and Evidence on Process (BG)
Gertner, Robert, David Scharfstein, and Jeremy Stein. 1994. “Internal Versus External Capital Markets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:1211-1230.
* Stein, Jeremy. 2002. “Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms.” Journal of Finance 57: 1891-1921.
Liberti, Jose and Atif Mian. 2006. “Estimating the Effect of Hierarchies on Information Use.” Working Paper Chicago GSB.
* Holmstrom, Bengt, and Jean Tirole. 1991. “Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 201-28.
* Bertrand, Marianne, Paras Mehta, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2002. “Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 121-48.

May 7: Conglomerates and Corporate Strategy (GB)
* Baker, George. 1992. “Beatrice: A Study in the Creation and Destruction of Value.” Journal of Finance 47: 1081-1119.
* Freeland, Robert. 1996. “The Myth of the M-Form? Governance, Consent, and Organizational Change.” American Journal of Sociology 102: 483-526.
* Bartlett, Christopher. 1993. “ABB’s Relays Business: Building and Managing a Global Matrix.” Harvard Business School Case #9-394-016.
Schoar, Antoinette. 2002. “Effects of Corporate Diversification on Productivity.” Journal of Finance 57: 2379-2403.
Villalonga, Belén. 2004. “Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence from Business InformationTracking Series Establishment-Level Data.” Journal of Finance 59: 475-502.
Villalonga, Belén. 2004. “Does Diversification Cause the ‘Diversification Discount’?” Financial Management 33: 5-27.
Mullainathan, Sendhil, and David Scharfstein. 2001. “Do Firm Boundaries Matter?” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 91: 195-99.

May 9: The Market for Corporate Control (GB)
* Baker, George P., and Karen Wruck. 1989 “Organizational Changes and Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts: The Case of O.M. Scott & Sons Company.” Journal of Financial Economics 25: 163-190.
* Kaplan, Steven N. 1989. “The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value.” Journal of Financial Economics 24: 217-254.
Jensen, Michael. and Richard Ruback. 1983. “The market for corporate control.” Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Steven Kaplan. 2003. “The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 15: 8-20.


Module 5: Beyond Firms (1.5 sessions)


May 14: Order without Law; Government Agencies (BG)
Greif, Avner. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.” American Economic Review 83:525-48.
Greif, Avner. 1994. “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies.” Journal of Political Economy 102: 912-50.
* Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast. 1994. “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild.” Journal of Political Economy 102: 745-76.
* Milgrom, P., D. North, and B. Weingast. 1990. “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economics and Politics 2: 1-23.
Dixit, Avinash. 2003. “On Modes of Economic Governance.” Econometrica 71: 449-81.
Wilson, James Q. 1989. “Compliance.” Chapter 9 in Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.
McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3: 243-77.
Moe, Terry. 1997. “The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy.” In D. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Banerjee, Abhijit. 1997. “A Theory of Misgovernance.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1289-32.

May 16: States (BG); Conclusion
* North, D. and B. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” The Journal of Economic History 49: 803-32.
Greif, Avner. 1994. “On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.” Journal of Economic History 54: 271-87.
Weingast, Barry. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” American Political Science Review 91: 245-63.
* Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics.” Journal of Comparative Economics 31: 620-52.
* Acemoglu, Daron. 2005. “Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States.” Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1199-1226.

books: Game theory

1
Game Theory 9
2
Game Theory A Critical Introduction
1995 1
3
Game Theory A Critical Text
2004 1
4
Game Theory A Non Technical Introduction To The Analysis Of Strategy
c2004 1
5
Game Theory A Nontechnical Introduction 2
6
Game Theory A Typology Of Feminist Players In Latina Chicana Writing 1985
2005 1
7
Game Theory A Very Short Introduction
2007 1
8
Game Theory Account And Defence Of Transnational Labour Standards A Preliminary Look At The Problem
2006 1
9
Game Theory An Introduction
c2008 1
10
Game Theory Analysis Of Conflict
c1991 1
11
Game Theory Analysis Of The Taiwan Issue Prospect And Possible Outcomes
c2003 1
12
Game Theory And Animal Behavior 2
13
Game Theory And Applications 3
14
Game Theory And Applications 3
c1997 1
15
Game Theory And Applications Iii
c1997 1
16
Game Theory And Applications Three
c1997 1
17
Game Theory And Artificial Intelligence
c2002 1
18
Game Theory And Business Applications 2
19
Game Theory And Competitive Strategy
2005 1
20
Game Theory And Decision Theory In Agent Based Systems
c2002 1
21
Game Theory And Economic Analysis A Quiet Revolution In Economics 2
22
Game Theory And Economic Modelling
1990 1
23
Game Theory And Evolution
c2005 1
24
Game Theory And Experimental Games
c1995 1
25
Game Theory And Experimental Games The Study Of Strategic Interaction
1982 1
26
Game Theory And Human Conflicts
1966 1
27
Game Theory And Individual Choice In Schooling
c2004 1
28
Game Theory And International Environmental Cooperation
c2001 1
29
Game Theory And International Environmental Policy
c2004 1
30
Game Theory And Its Applications In The Social And Biological Sciences
c1995 1
31
Game Theory And Mathematical Economics Proceedings Of The Seminar On Game Theory And Mathematical Economics Bonn Hagen 7
c1981 1
32
=Game theory and mutual misunderstanding -- See kaneko mamoru 1950 G¯emu riron to konnyaku mond¯o. English 1
33
Game Theory And Mutual Misunderstanding Scientific Dialogues In Five Acts
2005 1
34
Game Theory And National Security
1988 1
35
Game Theory And Political Science
1978 1
36
Game Theory And Political Theory An Introduction
1986 1
37
Game Theory And Politics
1975 1
38
Game Theory And Programming
1955 1
39
Game Theory And Related Approaches To Social Behavior Selections
c1964 1
40
Game Theory And Related Topics Proceedings Of The Seminar On Game Theory And Related Topics Bonn Hagen 26 29 September 19
1979 1
41
Game Theory And Strategy
c1993 1
42
Game Theory And The Environment
c1998 1
43
Game Theory And The Law 2
44
Game Theory And The Social Contract
c1998 1
45
Game Theory Appl
1995- 1
46
Game Theory Application To Operation Control And Pricing In Deregulated Power Systems
2000 1
47
Game Theory Approaches
2006 1
48
Game Theory As A Theory Of Conflict Resolution
1974 1
49
Game Theory At Work How To Use Game Theory To Outthink And Outmaneuver Your Competition 3
50
Game Theory Concepts And Applications
c1984 1
51
Game Theory Decisions Interaction And Evolution
c2007 1
52
Game Theory Evolving A Problem Centered Introduction To Modeling Strategic Behavior
c2000 1
53
Game Theory Experience Rationality Foundations Of Social Sciences Economics And Ethics In Honor Of John C Harsanyi
c1998 1
54
Game Theory For Applied Economists
c1992 1
55
Game Theory For Economic Analysis
1983 1
56
Game Theory For Economists
c1993 1
57
Game Theory For Political Scientists
c1994 1
58
Game Theory For The Social Sciences -- 2 entries 2
59
Game Theory For Wireless Engineers
c2006 1
60
Game Theory In International Economics
c1986 1
61
Game Theory In Supply Chain Analysis
c2004 1
62
Game Theory In The Behavioral Sciences
1969 1
63
Game Theory In The Social Sciences
c1984 1
64
Game Theory In The Social Sciences Concepts And Solutions
c1982 1
65
Game Theory Lectures For Economists And Systems Scientists
c1977 1
66
Game Theory Mathematical Models Of Conflict
1980 1
67
=Game Theory Mathematical Programming And Operations Research -- See Theory and decision library. Series C, Game theory, mathematical programming, and operations research
1
68
Game Theory Model Of Celebrity Endorsements
1996 1
69
Game Theory Modeling Interstate Conflict
2006 1
70
Game Theory Optimal Stopping Probability And Statistics Papers In Honor Of Thomas S Ferguson
c2000 1
71
Game Theory Stochastics Information Strategies And Cooperation
c2000 1
72
Game Theory Topics Incomplete Information Repeated Games And N Player Games
c1998 1
73
Game Theory Versus Multiple Agents The Iterated Prisoners Dilemma
c1994 1
74
Game Theory With Applications To Economics 2
75
Game Theory With Economic Applications
1995 1

0books: Grossman, Sanford (1)

Grossman, Sanford J.
The informational role of prices / Sanford J. Grossman
http://laurel.lso.missouri.edu/record=b2226150~S8&searchscope=0

0books: Klein Benjamin (2)

Klein Benjamin 1943
1
The Role Of U.S. Mutlinational [I.E. Multinational] Corporations In Recent Exchange Crises / by Benjamin Klein.
1974
-->
2
The Selection Of Disputes For Litigation / George L. Priest, Benjamin Klein.
1984

books: Milgrom Paul (3)

Milgrom Paul R Paul Robert 1948
1
Economics, Organization, And Management / Paul Milgrom, John Roberts.
c1992
-->
2
Putting Auction Theory To Work / Paul Milgrom.
2004
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3
Putting Auction Theory To Work / [Electronic Resource] / Paul Milgrom.
2004

0books: Holmstrom Bengt (6)

Holmstrom Bengt
1
The Cost Of Capital In Non-Marketed Firms / Bengt Holmström.
1979
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2
Design Of Incentive Schemes And The New Soviet Incentive Model / Bengt Holmström.
1979
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3
Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts / Bengt Holmström.
1979
-->
4
The Investment Banking Contract And New Issues / David P. Baron And Bengt Holmström.
1979
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5
A Note On Pollution Control / Bengt Holmström.
1978
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6
Palkkojen Jäykkyyden Ja Työttömyyden Sopimusteoreettinen Perusta / Bengt Holmström.
1979

Transaction cost economics literature

Transaction cost economics

Market or Hierachy, transaction cost.

two individual firm or one firm

Market relation: two firm exchange product

firm:

Relation contract



* Oliver E. Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations," Journal of Law and Economics 22 (October 1979): 233-61. Chapter 12 in Williamson, 1990.

* Benjamin Klein, Robert A. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978): 297-326.

Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece, "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics 13, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 206-13.

* Scott E. Masten, "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Law and Economics 27 (October 1984): 403-17.

* Brian S. Silverman, Jackson A. Nickerson, and John Freeman, "Profitability, Transactional Alignment, and Organizational Mortality in the U.S. Trucking Industry," Strategic Management Journal 18 (Summer 1997): 31-52.

* Paul L. Joskow, "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review 77 (March 1987): 168-85.

+ Kyle J. Mayer and Nicholas S. Argyres, "Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry," Organization Science 15, no. 4 (August 2004): 394–410.

+ Michael G. Jacobides and Sidney G. Winter, "The Co-evolution of Capabilities and Transaction Costs: Explaining the Institutional Structure of Production," Strategic Management Journal 26 (2005): 395-413.

about Coase

Coase think firm and market are substitutive institution. Firm and market are all contracts, and people's cooperative relationship. Especially in the situation of Vertical Integration, firms and market are substitutive.



* Ronald H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica NS 4, no. 16 (November 1937): 386-405.
* Ronald H. Coase, "The Institutional Structure of Production," American Economic Review 82, no 4 (September 1992): 713-19.

Ronald H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm: Meaning," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 19-32.
Ronald H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm: Influence," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 33-47.

important blog

organizations and markets
http://organizationsandmarkets.com/

orgtheory
http://orgtheory.wordpress.com/

creative_capitalism
http://creativecapitalism.typepad.com/creative_capitalism/

brokensymmetry
http://brokensymmetry.typepad.com/

two blogs of wgreen
1) moralmidnight
http://moralmidnight.wordpress.com/
2) A Little Lower Than the Angels
http://alltta.wordpress.com/

Fee's blogs
Foundation for Economic Education
http://www.fee.org/
Anything Peaceful
http://www.feeblog.org/

aristotlethegeek
http://aristotlethegeek.wordpress.com/

books: Hayek Friedrich (103)

Hayek Friedrich A Von Friedrich August 1899 1992
1
1980s Unemployment And The Unions : Essays On The Impotent Price Structure Of Britain And Monopoly / F.A. Hayek.
1980
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2
1980s Unemployment And The Unions : Essays On The Impotent Price Structure Of Britain And Monopoly / F.A. Hayek, With A Postscript ... From Taff Vale To Tebbit / By Charles G. Hanson.
1984
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3
Beiträge Zur Geldtheorie, / von Marco Fanno, Marius W. Holtrop, Johan G. Koopmans [U. A.]...
1933
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4
Capitalism And The Historians; / essays By T. S. Ashton [And Others.]
c1954
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5
Capitalism And The Historians, / essays By T. S. Ashton [And Others.
1963
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6
Choice In Currency : A Way To Stop Inflation / [By] F. A. Hayek ; With Commentaries By Ivor F. Pearce ... [And Others].
1976
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7
=Collected works of F.A. Hayek. 1989 -- See Hayek, Friedrich A. von (Friedrich August), 1899-1992. Works. 1989
-->
8
=Collected works of Friedrich August Hayek. 1988 -- See Hayek, Friedrich A. von (Friedrich August), 1899-1992. Works. 1988
-->
9
Collectivist Economic Planning; Critical Studies On The Possibilities Of Socialism, / by N. G. Pierson [And Others] Edited, With An Introd. And A Concluding Essay By F. A. Hayek.
1975
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10
Collectivist Economic Planning; Critical Studies On The Possibilities Of Socialism, / by N. G. Pierson [And Others] Edited, With An Introd. And A Concluding Essay By F. A. Hayek.
1970
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11
Collectivist Economic Planning; Critical Studies On The Possibilities Of Socialism / by N. G. Pierson, Ludwig Von Mises, Georg Halm, And Enrico Barone; Edited, With An Introduction And
1938
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12
The Confusion Of Language In Political Thought, With Some Suggestions For Remedying It / [By] F. A. Hayek.
1968
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13
The Constitution Of Liberty.
1960
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14
The Counter-Revolution Of Science : Studies On The Abuse Of Reason / by F.A. Hayek.
1964
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15
The Counter-Revolution Of Science; Studies On The Abuse Of Reason.
1952
-->
16
The Counter-Revolution Of Science : Studies On The Abuse Of Reason / F. A. Hayek.
1979
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17
Currency Competition And Monetary Union / edited By Pascal Salin ; With Contributions Of Friedrich Hayek ... [Et Al.].
1984
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18
Denationalisation Of Money : An Analysis Of The Theory And Practice Of Concurrent Currencies / [By] F. A. Hayek.
1976
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19
Denationalisation Of Money : The Argument Refined : An Analysis Of The Theory And Practice Of Concu / [By] F. A. Hayek.
1978
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20
Denationalisation Of Money : The Argument Refined : An Analysis Of The Theory And Practice Of Concu / F.A. Hayek.
1990
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21
Economic Freedom / Friedrich A. Hayek.
1991
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22
Economic Freedom And Representative Government / [By] F. A. Hayek.
1973
-->
23
An Enquiry Into The Nature And Effects Of The Paper Credit Of Great Britain (1802) / by Henry Thornton, Together With His Evidence Given Before The Committees Of Secrecy Of The Two Hous
1965
-->
24
An Enquiry Into The Nature And Effects Of The Paper Credit Of Great Britain (1802) / by Henry Thornton, Together With His Evidence Given Before The Committees Of Secrecy Of The Two Hous
1939
-->
25
An Enquiry Into The Nature And Effects Of The Paper Credit Of Great Britain (1802) / by Henry Thornton, Together With His Evidence Given Before The Committees Of Secrecy Of The Two Hous
1939
-->
26
The Essence Of Hayek / edited By Chiaki Nishiyama, Kurt R. Leube ; Foreword By W. Glenn Campbell.
c1984
-->
27
The Fatal Conceit : The Errors Of Socialism / edited By W.W. Bartley III.
1989
-->
28
The Fortunes Of Liberalism : Essays On Austrian Economics And The Ideal Of Freedom / edited By Peter G. Klein.
1992
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29
Freedom And The Economic System / [By] Friedrich A. Von Hayek ...
1939
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30
Friedrich A. Hayek, Honorary Fellow At The Hoover Institution, Speaks On The Reactionary Character Of The Socialist Conception To The Advisory Committee Of The Domestic Studies Program And The 1978-1979 Visiting Scholars, Stanford University, October 27, 1978.
c1979
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31
Full Employment At Any Price? / F. A. Hayek.
1975
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32
Geldtheorie Und Konjunkturtheorie, / von Friedrich A. Hayek.
1929
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33
Good Money / edited By Stephen Kresge.
1999
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34
Hayek : Economist And Social Philosopher : A Critical Retrospect / edited By Stephen F. Frowen.
1997
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35
Hayek On Hayek : An Autobiographical Dialogue / F.A. Hayek ; Edited By Stephen Kresge And Leif Wenar.
c1994
-->
36
Individualism And Economic Order, [Essays].
c1948
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37
Intellectuals And Socialism.
2005
-->
38
The Intellectuals And Socialism / F. A. Hayek.
1990
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39
John Stuart Mill And Harriet Taylor, Their Correspondence [I.E. Friendship] And Subsequent Marriage / by F.A. Hayek.
1951
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40
John Stuart Mill And Harriet Taylor, Their Friendship And Subsequent Marriage, / by F. A. Hayek.
1969
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41
Knowledge, Evolution And Society / F.A. Hayek.
1983
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42
Law, Legislation And Liberty; A New Statement Of The Liberal Principles Of Justice And Political Ec / [By] F. A. Hayek.
1973-
-->
43
Law, Legislation And Liberty ; V. 1.
1973
-->
44
Law, Legislation And Liberty ; V. 2.
c1976
-->
45
The Mirage Of Social Justice / F. A. Hayek.
c1976
-->
46
Monetary Nationalism And International Stability, / by F. A. Hayek.
1964
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47
Monetary Nationalism And International Stability, / by F.A. Von Hayek.
1937
-->
48
Monetary Nationalism And International Stability, / by F. A. Von Hayek.
1939
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49
Monetary Theory And The Trade Cycle, / by Friedrich A. Hayek.
1966
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50
Monetary Theory And The Trade Cycle, / by Friedrich A. Hayek ... Translated From The German By N. Kaldor And H.M. Croome.
1933


Hayek Friedrich A Von Friedrich August 1899 1992
51
Money, Capital, And Fluctuations : Early Essays / F.A. Hayek ; Edited By Roy McCloughry.
1984
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52
New Studies In Philosophy, Politics, Economics And The History Of Ideas / F. A. Hayek.
1978
-->
53
New Studies In Philosophy, Politics, Economics, And The History Of Ideas / F. A. Hayek.
1978
-->
54
Outlook For The 1970s: Open Or Repressed Inflation? 1972.
1972
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55
The Political Economy Of Freedom : Essays In Honor Of F.A. Hayek / edited By Kurt R. Leube And Albert H. Zlabinger.
c1985
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56
The Political Order Of A Free People / F. A. Hayek.
1979
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57
Preise Und Produktion, / von Friedrich A. Hayek.
1931
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58
Prices And Production, / by Friedrich A. Hayek, With A Foreword By Lionel Robbins.
1931
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59
Prices And Production.
1935
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60
Profits, Interest, And Investment, And Other Essays On The Theory Of Industrial Fluctuations, / by Friedrich A. Von Hayek.
1969
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61
Profits, Interest And Investment, And Other Essays On The Theory Of Industrial Fluctuations,
1939
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62
The Pure Theory Of Capital, / by Friedrich A. Hayek.
1941
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63
The Pure Theory Of Capital.
1950
-->
64
The Pure Theory Of Capital / by Friedrich A. Hayek.
1941
-->
65
Rent Control : A Popular Paradox : Evidence On The Economic Effects Of Rent Control / by F. A. Hayek ... [Et Al.].
1975
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66
Rent Control : A Popular Paradox : Evidence On The Economic Effects Of Rent Control / by F. A. Hayek...[Et Al.]
1976
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67
Rent Control, Myths & Realities : International Evidence Of The Effects Of Rent Control In Six Coun / contributors Include Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, And Basil Kalymon ; Co-Edited By Walter Block
1981
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68
The Road To Serfdom, / by F.A. Hayek; With Foreword By John Chamberlain.
c1944
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69
The Road To Serfdom / by Friedrich A. Hayek ; With A Foreword By John Chamberlain.
c1944
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70
The Road To Serfdom / by Friedrich A. Hayek.
1980?
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71
The Road To Serfdom / by Friedrich A. Hayek.
1944
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72
The Road To Serfdom, / by F.A. Hayek.
1944
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73
The Road To Serfdom : Text And Documents / [F. A. Hayek] ; Edited By Bruce Caldwell.
2007
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74
The Road To Serfdom : The Condensed Version Of The Road To Serfdom By F.A. Hayek As It Appeared In / Friedrich A. Hayek ; Foreword By Edwin J. Feulner Jr. ; Introduction By John Blundell.
2001
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75
The Road To Serfdom ; With, The Intellectuals And Socialism / Friedrich A. Hayek.
2005
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76
Roads To Freedom; Essays In Honour Of Friedrich A. Von Hayek. / Edited By Erich Streissler [And Others]
1969
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77
Roads To Freedom; Essays In Honour Of Friedrich A. Von Hayek. / Edited By Erich Streissler [And Others]
1970
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78
Roads To Freedom : Essays In Honour Of Friedrich A. Von Hayek / edited By Erich Streissler.
1969
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79
The Rule Of Law / F. A. Hayek.
1975
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80
Rules And Order / [By] F. A. Hayek.
1973
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81
The Sensory Order; An Inquiry Into The Foundations Of Theoretical Psychology. / With An Introduction By Heinrich Klüver.
1963
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82
The Sensory Order : An Inquiry Into The Foundations Of Theoretical Psychology / by F.A. Hayek, With An Introd. By Heinrich Klüver.
1952
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83
Socialism And War : Essays, Documents, Reviews / edited By Bruce Calwell.
c1997
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84
The Spirit Of The Age / [By] John Stuart Mill. Introductory Essay By Frederick A. Von Hayek.
1942
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85
Studies In Philosophy, Politics And Economics / [By] F. A. Hayek.
1967
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86
Studies In Philosophy, Politics And Economics / [By] F.A. Hayek.
1969
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87
A Tiger By The Tail: A 40-Years' Running Commentary On Keynesianism By Hayek; / compiled And Introduced By Sudha R. Shenoy; With A New Essay On The Outlook For The 1970s: Open Or R
1972
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88
Toward Liberty; Essays In Honor Of Ludwig Von Mises On The Occasion Of His 90th Birthday, September / Sponsoring Committee: F. A. Von Hayek [And Others]
1971
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89
The Trend Of Economic Thinking : Essays On Political Economists And Economic History / edited By W.W. Bartley III And Stephen Kresge.
1991
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90
The Trend Of Economic Thinking Essays On Political Economists And Economic History / [Electronic Resource] : [F.A. Hayek] ; Edited By W.W. Bartley III And Stephen Kresge.
1991
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91
Verdict On Rent Control: Essays On The Economic Consequences Of Political Action To Restrict Rents / [By] F. A. Hayek [And Others; With An Introduction By F. G. Pennance.
1972
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92
Der Wettbewerb Als Entdeckungsverfahren, / von F. A. Von Hayek.
1968
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93
Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft Und Politik.
1963
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94
Works. 1988 ; V. 3.
1991
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95
The Collected Works Of F.A. Hayek / edited By W.W. Bartley III.
1989-
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96
Works. 1989.
c1994
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97
Works. 1989 ; V. 1.
1989
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98
Works. 1989 ; V. 2.
2007
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99
Works. 1989 ; V. 3.
1991
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100
Works. 1989 ; V. 4.
1992

101
Works. 1989 ; V. 5.
1999
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102
Works. 1989 ; V. 6.
1999
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103
Works. 1989 ; V. 10.
c1997
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