http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainability
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renewable_resource
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_resources
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renewable_energy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_agriculture
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_architecture
Friday, December 19, 2008
wiki: organization
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-profit_organization
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_agency
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_corporation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Startup_company
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Not_Just_For_Profit
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_Social_Responsibility
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_bottom_line
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_(corporate)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shareholder
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Investors
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employment
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Customer
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creditor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supplier
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labor_union
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industry_trade_group
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professional_association
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BINGO short for business-oriented international NGO, or big international NGO
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NGO Non-governmental organization
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_nongovernmental_organization INO
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmental_organizations IGO
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interest_group
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Think_tank
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_think_tanks
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-profit_organization
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_agency
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_corporation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Startup_company
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Not_Just_For_Profit
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_Social_Responsibility
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_bottom_line
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_(corporate)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shareholder
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Investors
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employment
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Customer
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creditor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supplier
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labor_union
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industry_trade_group
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professional_association
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BINGO short for business-oriented international NGO, or big international NGO
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NGO Non-governmental organization
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_nongovernmental_organization INO
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmental_organizations IGO
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interest_group
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Think_tank
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_think_tanks
stakeholder
Jensen.2001.Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function SSRN-id220671
Jensen.2001. criticize the theory of stakeholder
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_(corporate)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_theory
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_analysis
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_(law)
Jensen.2001. criticize the theory of stakeholder
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_(corporate)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_theory
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_analysis
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_(law)
Sunday, December 14, 2008
book: Foss.2000.The Theory Of The Firm
Foss Nicolai J 1964
2000.The Theory Of The Firm : Critical Perspectives On Business And Management / edited By Nicolai J. Foss.
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Theory-Firm-Set-Perspectives-Management/dp/041519637X/ref=sr_1_12?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1229315177&sr=1-12
(4-Volume Set)
Table of Contents
Overviews of the field:
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1942, "The Theory of the Firm in the Last Ten Years," American Economic Review 32: 791 - 802.
Papandreou, Andreas 1952 "Some Basic Problems in the Theory of the Firm" in B. F. Haley ed. 1952. A Survey of Contemporary Economics Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin. Machlup, Fritz 1967 "Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioural, Managerial," American Economic Review57: 1-33.
McNulty, Paul J. 1984, "On the Nature and Theory of Economic Organisation: The Role of the Firm Reconsidered," History of Political Economy 16: 233-253.
Moss, Scott 1984 "The History of the Theory of the Firm from Marshall to Robinson and Chamberlain: the Source of Positivism in Economics,"Economica 51:307 - 318.
Milgrom, Paul J. and John D. Roberts 1988, "Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present and Future," Canadian Journal of Economics 21: 444-458.
Hart, Oliver D. 1989 "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm," Columbia Law Review 89(7):1757-1774.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole 1989 "The Theory of the Firm," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D Willig 1989 Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 1 Amsterdam: North Holland.
II. The nexus of contracts review
Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz, 1972, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organisation," American Economic Review 62(5):772-795.
Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling 1976 "The Theory of the Firm: Managerial, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure."
Fama, Eugene, 1980, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" Journal of Political Economy 88:288-307.
Cheung, Steven S.N. 1983, "The Contractual Nature of the Firm" Journal of Law and Economics 26:1-22.
Fama, Eugene and Michael Jensen 1983, "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics 26 (June): 327-49.
Barzel, Yoram 1997, "The Old Firm and the New Organisation" chapter 5 from Economic Analysis of Property Rights, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jensen, Michael and William Meckling 1992, "Specific and General Knowledge and Organisational Structure," in Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, eds 1992. Contract Economics Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
III. Formal Agency Work
Hart, Oliver and Bengt Holmstrom 1987, "The Theory of Contracts" in Truman F. Bewley 1987, Advances in Economic Theory. Fifth World Congress Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, Stephen, 1973, "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem."American Economic Review 63: 134-139.
Holmstrom, Bengt 1979, "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.
Holmstrom, Bengt, 1982, "Moral Hazard in Teams" Bell Journal of Economics 13: 324-340.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom, 1991, "Multi-task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design" Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 7:24-52.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom, 1994, "The Firm as an Incentive System" American Economic Review 84: 972-991.
Lewis, Tracy and David Sappington 1991, "Technological Change and the Boundaries of the Firm" American Economic Review 81: 887-900.
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole, 1997, "Formal and Real Authority in Organisation" Journal of Political Economy 105:1-29.
IV Incomplete Contracts: The Coordination Perspective
Coase, Ronald H. 1937, "The Nature of the Firm", Economica (N.S.) 4:386-405 (November). Malmgren, Harold B., 1961, "Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm" Quarterly Journal of Economics 75: 399-421. Simon, Herbert A. 1951, "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship" Econometrica 19:293-305. Loasby, Brian J. 1994, "Organisational Capabilities and Interfirm Relations", Metroeconomica 45: 248-265. Wernerfelt, Birger 1997, "On the Nature and Scope of the Firm: an adjustment Cost Theory",
2000.The Theory Of The Firm : Critical Perspectives On Business And Management / edited By Nicolai J. Foss.
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Theory-Firm-Set-Perspectives-Management/dp/041519637X/ref=sr_1_12?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1229315177&sr=1-12
(4-Volume Set)
Table of Contents
Overviews of the field:
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1942, "The Theory of the Firm in the Last Ten Years," American Economic Review 32: 791 - 802.
Papandreou, Andreas 1952 "Some Basic Problems in the Theory of the Firm" in B. F. Haley ed. 1952. A Survey of Contemporary Economics Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin. Machlup, Fritz 1967 "Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioural, Managerial," American Economic Review57: 1-33.
McNulty, Paul J. 1984, "On the Nature and Theory of Economic Organisation: The Role of the Firm Reconsidered," History of Political Economy 16: 233-253.
Moss, Scott 1984 "The History of the Theory of the Firm from Marshall to Robinson and Chamberlain: the Source of Positivism in Economics,"Economica 51:307 - 318.
Milgrom, Paul J. and John D. Roberts 1988, "Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present and Future," Canadian Journal of Economics 21: 444-458.
Hart, Oliver D. 1989 "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm," Columbia Law Review 89(7):1757-1774.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole 1989 "The Theory of the Firm," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D Willig 1989 Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 1 Amsterdam: North Holland.
II. The nexus of contracts review
Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz, 1972, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organisation," American Economic Review 62(5):772-795.
Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling 1976 "The Theory of the Firm: Managerial, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure."
Fama, Eugene, 1980, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" Journal of Political Economy 88:288-307.
Cheung, Steven S.N. 1983, "The Contractual Nature of the Firm" Journal of Law and Economics 26:1-22.
Fama, Eugene and Michael Jensen 1983, "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics 26 (June): 327-49.
Barzel, Yoram 1997, "The Old Firm and the New Organisation" chapter 5 from Economic Analysis of Property Rights, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jensen, Michael and William Meckling 1992, "Specific and General Knowledge and Organisational Structure," in Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, eds 1992. Contract Economics Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
III. Formal Agency Work
Hart, Oliver and Bengt Holmstrom 1987, "The Theory of Contracts" in Truman F. Bewley 1987, Advances in Economic Theory. Fifth World Congress Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, Stephen, 1973, "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem."American Economic Review 63: 134-139.
Holmstrom, Bengt 1979, "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.
Holmstrom, Bengt, 1982, "Moral Hazard in Teams" Bell Journal of Economics 13: 324-340.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom, 1991, "Multi-task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design" Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 7:24-52.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom, 1994, "The Firm as an Incentive System" American Economic Review 84: 972-991.
Lewis, Tracy and David Sappington 1991, "Technological Change and the Boundaries of the Firm" American Economic Review 81: 887-900.
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole, 1997, "Formal and Real Authority in Organisation" Journal of Political Economy 105:1-29.
IV Incomplete Contracts: The Coordination Perspective
Coase, Ronald H. 1937, "The Nature of the Firm", Economica (N.S.) 4:386-405 (November). Malmgren, Harold B., 1961, "Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm" Quarterly Journal of Economics 75: 399-421. Simon, Herbert A. 1951, "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship" Econometrica 19:293-305. Loasby, Brian J. 1994, "Organisational Capabilities and Interfirm Relations", Metroeconomica 45: 248-265. Wernerfelt, Birger 1997, "On the Nature and Scope of the Firm: an adjustment Cost Theory",
Note: Hart.1990
edition 1
Hart.1990.an economist's perspective on the theory of the firm
in Williamson.1990.organization theory. P154-171
edition 2
Hart, Oliver D. 1989 "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm," Columbia Law Review 89(7):1757-1774.
1)
Williamson.1988.the logic of economic organization. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4, pp. 65-94 .
2)
Milgrom, Paul J. and John D. Roberts 1988, "Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present and Future," Canadian Journal of Economics 21: 444-458.
3)
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole 1989 "The Theory of the Firm," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D Willig 1989 Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 1 Amsterdam: North Holland.
Hart.1990.an economist's perspective on the theory of the firm
in Williamson.1990.organization theory. P154-171
edition 2
Hart, Oliver D. 1989 "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm," Columbia Law Review 89(7):1757-1774.
1)
Williamson.1988.the logic of economic organization. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4, pp. 65-94 .
2)
Milgrom, Paul J. and John D. Roberts 1988, "Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present and Future," Canadian Journal of Economics 21: 444-458.
3)
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole 1989 "The Theory of the Firm," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D Willig 1989 Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 1 Amsterdam: North Holland.
Saturday, December 13, 2008
NIE
New Institutional Econometrics: The Case of Contracting and Organizations Research
Michael E. Sykuta
University of Missouri at Columbia - Contracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI); University of Missouri at Columbia - Division of Applied Social Sciences
April 7, 2005
CORI Working Paper No. 2005-04
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=700654
New Institutional Economics
Peter G. Klein
University of Missouri at Columbia - Contracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=115811
Williamson, O., 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature38, 595–613.
coase
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Books: Knight, Frank H.
Knight Frank H Frank Hyneman 1885 1972
1
The Economic Order And Religion / [By] Frank H. Knight ... And Thornton W. Merriam ... 1945
2
The Economic Organization. c1933
3
The Economic Organization. With An Article, Notes On Cost And Utility. 1967
4
The Economic Organization. With An Article, Notes On Cost And Utility. 1951
5
The Ethics Of Competition / [Electronic Resource] / Frank Hyneman Knight ; With A New Introduction By Richard Boyd.
c1997
6
The Ethics Of Competition And Other Essays. 1969
7
The Ethics Of Competition, And Other Essays / by Frank Hyneman Knight. 1951
8
The Ethics Of Competition And Other Essays. 1951
9
The Ethics Of Competition And Other Essays / by Frank Hyneman Knight. 1935
10
Freedom And Reform : Essays In Economics And Social Philosophy / Frank H. Knight. 1982
11
Freedom And Reform : Essays In Economics And Social Philosophy / by Frank H. Knight. 1947
12
General Economic History, / by Max Weber, Translated By Frank H. Knight.
c1927
13
General Economic History / by Max Weber ; Translated By Frank H. Knight. 1927?
14
General Economic History, / by Max Weber, Translated By Frank H. Knight. 1950
15
Intelligence And Democratic Action / by Frank H. Knight.
c1960
16
On The History And Method Of Economics; Selected Essays. 1966
17
On The History And Method Of Economics; Selected Essays. 1956
18
Risk, Uncertainty And Profit / [By] Frank H. Knight. 1965
19
Risk, Uncertainty And Profit ; / by Frank H. Knight. 1964
20
Risk, Uncertainty And Profit, / by Frank H. Knight. 1948
21
Risk, Uncertainty And Profit, / with An Introductory Essay Hitherto Unpublished. 1957
22
Selected Essays By Frank H. Knight / edited By Ross B. Emmett. 1999-
1
The Economic Order And Religion / [By] Frank H. Knight ... And Thornton W. Merriam ... 1945
2
The Economic Organization. c1933
3
The Economic Organization. With An Article, Notes On Cost And Utility. 1967
4
The Economic Organization. With An Article, Notes On Cost And Utility. 1951
5
The Ethics Of Competition / [Electronic Resource] / Frank Hyneman Knight ; With A New Introduction By Richard Boyd.
c1997
6
The Ethics Of Competition And Other Essays. 1969
7
The Ethics Of Competition, And Other Essays / by Frank Hyneman Knight. 1951
8
The Ethics Of Competition And Other Essays. 1951
9
The Ethics Of Competition And Other Essays / by Frank Hyneman Knight. 1935
10
Freedom And Reform : Essays In Economics And Social Philosophy / Frank H. Knight. 1982
11
Freedom And Reform : Essays In Economics And Social Philosophy / by Frank H. Knight. 1947
12
General Economic History, / by Max Weber, Translated By Frank H. Knight.
c1927
13
General Economic History / by Max Weber ; Translated By Frank H. Knight. 1927?
14
General Economic History, / by Max Weber, Translated By Frank H. Knight. 1950
15
Intelligence And Democratic Action / by Frank H. Knight.
c1960
16
On The History And Method Of Economics; Selected Essays. 1966
17
On The History And Method Of Economics; Selected Essays. 1956
18
Risk, Uncertainty And Profit / [By] Frank H. Knight. 1965
19
Risk, Uncertainty And Profit ; / by Frank H. Knight. 1964
20
Risk, Uncertainty And Profit, / by Frank H. Knight. 1948
21
Risk, Uncertainty And Profit, / with An Introductory Essay Hitherto Unpublished. 1957
22
Selected Essays By Frank H. Knight / edited By Ross B. Emmett. 1999-
vib
HB119.S47 L44 2001 1
The legacy of Herbert Simon in economic analysis / edited by Peter E. Earl.
HB129.5.T44 A25 1998
Economic performance and the theory of the firm / David J. Teece.
HB171.5 .A338 1977
Exchange and production : competition, coordination, and control / Armen Alchian and William R. Alle
HB241 .S284 1979
Theories of the firm / Malcolm C. Sawyer.
HB241 .T496 2000
Theory of the firm : Erich Gutenberg's foundations and further developments / H. Albach ... [et al.,
HB501 .V515 1987
Money capital in the theory of the firm : a preliminary analysis / Douglas Vickers.
HB601 .O23 1983
Profit theory and capitalism / Mark Obrinsky.
HB846.3 .C63 1997
Coasean economics : law and economics and the new institutional economics / edited by Steven G. Mede
HB846.3 .D54 1994
Transaction cost economics and beyond : towards a new economics of the firm / Michael Dietrich.
HB846.3 .R36 2003
The economics of transaction costs : theory, methods, and applications / P.K. Rao.
HB846.3 .S87 1993
Transaction costs, markets and hierarchies / edited by Christos Pitelis.
HB846.3 .T73 1996
Transaction cost economics and beyond / edited by John Groenewegen.
HB846.3 .T73 1997
Transaction cost economics : recent developments / edited by Claude Menard.
HB97 .H63 2001
How economics forgot history : the problem of historical specificity in social science / Geoffrey M.
HB97.3 .H633 1999
Evolution and institutions : on evolutionary economics and the evolution of economics / Geoffrey M.
HB97.3 .N67 2005
Understanding the process of economic change / Douglass C. North.
HB99.5 .I587 2000
Institutions, contracts, and organizations : perspectives from new institutional economics / edited
HC255 .B59 2008
The rise of modern business : Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, and China / Mansel G
HD2326 .C498 2000
Organisations in action : competition between contexts / Peter Clark.
HD2326 .C64 2008
The economics of organizational design : theoretical insights and empirical evidence / Massimo G. Co
HD2326 .C94 1988
The economic theory of organization and the firm / Richard M. Cyert.
HD2326 .F548 1999
Firms, markets, and hierarchies : the transaction cost economics perspective / edited by Glenn R. Ca
HD2326 .F67 2005
Strategy, economic organization, and the knowledge economy : the coordination of firms and resources
HD2326 .H28 1989 2
Handbook of industrial organization / edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig.
HD2326 .I24 1993
The cooperative nature of the firm / Tatsuro Ichiishi.
HD2326 .L45 1987
Inside the firm : the inefficiencies of hierarchy / Harvey Leibenstein.
HD2326 .S265 2000
An entrepreneurial theory of the firm / Frédéric E. Sautet ; with a foreword by Israel M. Kirzner.
HD2326 .S27 1981
The economics of industries and firms : theories, evidence and policy / Malcolm C. Sawyer.
HD2326 .S72 1999
Market microstructure : intermediaries and the theory of the firm / Daniel F. Spulber.
HD2326 .T69 1996
Towards a competence theory of the firm / edited by Nicolai J. Foss and Christian Knudsen.
HD2328 .T85 1992
Economic hierarchies, organization, and the structure of production / Gordon Tullock.
HD2356.U5 P67 1973
The rise of big business, 1860-1910 / Glenn Porter.
HD2711 .B49 1997
Beyond the firm : business groups in international and historical perspective / edited by Takao Shib
HD2741 .C77 1993
Corporate control and accountability : changing structures and the dynamics of regulation / edited b
HD2741 .C77462 2003
Corporate governance / John L. Colley, Jr. ... [et al.].
HD2741 .C779 2000
Corporate governance : theoretical and empirical perspectives / edited by Xavier Vives.
HD2741 .J46 2000
A theory of the firm : governance, residual claims, and organizational forms / Michael C. Jensen.
HD2755.5 .L484 2005
Leviathans : multinational corporations and the new global history / edited by Alfred D. Chandler, J
HD2785 .B544 1996
Wealth creation and wealth sharing : a colloquium on corporate governance and investments in human c
HD2785 .C47 1985
The coming of managerial capitalism : a casebook on the history of American economic institutions /
HD2785 .C4732 1988
The essential Alfred Chandler : essays toward a historical theory of big business / edited and with
HD2785 .C474 1990
Scale and scope : the dynamics of industrial capitalism / Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. with the assistanc
HD2785 .H32 1996
The ownership of enterprise / Henry Hansmann.
HD2785 .M57
The American corporate network, 1904-1974 / Mark S. Mizruchi ; foreword by G. William Domhoff.
HD2795 .B53 1968
The modern corporation and private property [by] Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means.
HD2795 .B548 1983
Law and economics of vertical integration and control / Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman.
HD30.22 .E25 1986
The Economic nature of the firm : a reader / edited by Louis Putterman with the assistance of Randy
HD30.22 .F566 2007
The firm as an entity : implications for economics, accounting and the law / edited by Yuri Biondi,
HD30.22 .M55 1992
Economics, organization, and management / Paul Milgrom, John Roberts.
HD30.27 .D78 1999
Management challenges for the 21st century / Peter F. Drucker.
HD31 .M442 1991
Managerial dilemmas : the political economy of hierarchy / Gary J. Miller.
HD31 .M457
The nature of managerial work.
HD31 .S55 1976
Administrative behavior : a study of decision-making processes in administrative organization / Herb
HD38 .C9
A behavioral theory of the firm [by] Richard M. Cyert [and] James G. March. With contributions by G.
HD45 .P4
The theory of the growth of the firm.
HD58.7 .D96 2001
Dynamics of organizations : computational modeling and organization theories / edited by Alessandro
HD58.7 .J463 1998
Foundations of organizational strategy / Michael C. Jensen.
HD70.U5 C5
Strategy and structure : chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise / Alfred D. Chandler,
HD9000.5 .A37 1996
Agricultural markets : mechanisms, failures, and regulations / edited by David Martimort.
HD9710.U52 C38
Giant enterprise: Ford, General Motors, and the automobile industry; sources and readings.
HF1414 .C456 2000
From Adam Smith to Michael Porter : evolution of competitiveness theory / Dong-Sung Cho, Hwy-Chang M
HF1414 .P67 1998
On competition / Michael E. Porter.
HF5686.C8 S644
Studies in costing. Edited on behalf of the Association of University Teachers of Accounting by Davi
HG3761 .F36 2002
Famous fables of economics : myths of market failures / edited by Daniel F. Spulber.
K840 .B65 2005
Contract theory / Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont.
K840 .E28 2002
The economics of contracts : theories and applications / edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Gl
The legacy of Herbert Simon in economic analysis / edited by Peter E. Earl.
HB129.5.T44 A25 1998
Economic performance and the theory of the firm / David J. Teece.
HB171.5 .A338 1977
Exchange and production : competition, coordination, and control / Armen Alchian and William R. Alle
HB241 .S284 1979
Theories of the firm / Malcolm C. Sawyer.
HB241 .T496 2000
Theory of the firm : Erich Gutenberg's foundations and further developments / H. Albach ... [et al.,
HB501 .V515 1987
Money capital in the theory of the firm : a preliminary analysis / Douglas Vickers.
HB601 .O23 1983
Profit theory and capitalism / Mark Obrinsky.
HB846.3 .C63 1997
Coasean economics : law and economics and the new institutional economics / edited by Steven G. Mede
HB846.3 .D54 1994
Transaction cost economics and beyond : towards a new economics of the firm / Michael Dietrich.
HB846.3 .R36 2003
The economics of transaction costs : theory, methods, and applications / P.K. Rao.
HB846.3 .S87 1993
Transaction costs, markets and hierarchies / edited by Christos Pitelis.
HB846.3 .T73 1996
Transaction cost economics and beyond / edited by John Groenewegen.
HB846.3 .T73 1997
Transaction cost economics : recent developments / edited by Claude Menard.
HB97 .H63 2001
How economics forgot history : the problem of historical specificity in social science / Geoffrey M.
HB97.3 .H633 1999
Evolution and institutions : on evolutionary economics and the evolution of economics / Geoffrey M.
HB97.3 .N67 2005
Understanding the process of economic change / Douglass C. North.
HB99.5 .I587 2000
Institutions, contracts, and organizations : perspectives from new institutional economics / edited
HC255 .B59 2008
The rise of modern business : Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, and China / Mansel G
HD2326 .C498 2000
Organisations in action : competition between contexts / Peter Clark.
HD2326 .C64 2008
The economics of organizational design : theoretical insights and empirical evidence / Massimo G. Co
HD2326 .C94 1988
The economic theory of organization and the firm / Richard M. Cyert.
HD2326 .F548 1999
Firms, markets, and hierarchies : the transaction cost economics perspective / edited by Glenn R. Ca
HD2326 .F67 2005
Strategy, economic organization, and the knowledge economy : the coordination of firms and resources
HD2326 .H28 1989 2
Handbook of industrial organization / edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig.
HD2326 .I24 1993
The cooperative nature of the firm / Tatsuro Ichiishi.
HD2326 .L45 1987
Inside the firm : the inefficiencies of hierarchy / Harvey Leibenstein.
HD2326 .S265 2000
An entrepreneurial theory of the firm / Frédéric E. Sautet ; with a foreword by Israel M. Kirzner.
HD2326 .S27 1981
The economics of industries and firms : theories, evidence and policy / Malcolm C. Sawyer.
HD2326 .S72 1999
Market microstructure : intermediaries and the theory of the firm / Daniel F. Spulber.
HD2326 .T69 1996
Towards a competence theory of the firm / edited by Nicolai J. Foss and Christian Knudsen.
HD2328 .T85 1992
Economic hierarchies, organization, and the structure of production / Gordon Tullock.
HD2356.U5 P67 1973
The rise of big business, 1860-1910 / Glenn Porter.
HD2711 .B49 1997
Beyond the firm : business groups in international and historical perspective / edited by Takao Shib
HD2741 .C77 1993
Corporate control and accountability : changing structures and the dynamics of regulation / edited b
HD2741 .C77462 2003
Corporate governance / John L. Colley, Jr. ... [et al.].
HD2741 .C779 2000
Corporate governance : theoretical and empirical perspectives / edited by Xavier Vives.
HD2741 .J46 2000
A theory of the firm : governance, residual claims, and organizational forms / Michael C. Jensen.
HD2755.5 .L484 2005
Leviathans : multinational corporations and the new global history / edited by Alfred D. Chandler, J
HD2785 .B544 1996
Wealth creation and wealth sharing : a colloquium on corporate governance and investments in human c
HD2785 .C47 1985
The coming of managerial capitalism : a casebook on the history of American economic institutions /
HD2785 .C4732 1988
The essential Alfred Chandler : essays toward a historical theory of big business / edited and with
HD2785 .C474 1990
Scale and scope : the dynamics of industrial capitalism / Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. with the assistanc
HD2785 .H32 1996
The ownership of enterprise / Henry Hansmann.
HD2785 .M57
The American corporate network, 1904-1974 / Mark S. Mizruchi ; foreword by G. William Domhoff.
HD2795 .B53 1968
The modern corporation and private property [by] Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means.
HD2795 .B548 1983
Law and economics of vertical integration and control / Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman.
HD30.22 .E25 1986
The Economic nature of the firm : a reader / edited by Louis Putterman with the assistance of Randy
HD30.22 .F566 2007
The firm as an entity : implications for economics, accounting and the law / edited by Yuri Biondi,
HD30.22 .M55 1992
Economics, organization, and management / Paul Milgrom, John Roberts.
HD30.27 .D78 1999
Management challenges for the 21st century / Peter F. Drucker.
HD31 .M442 1991
Managerial dilemmas : the political economy of hierarchy / Gary J. Miller.
HD31 .M457
The nature of managerial work.
HD31 .S55 1976
Administrative behavior : a study of decision-making processes in administrative organization / Herb
HD38 .C9
A behavioral theory of the firm [by] Richard M. Cyert [and] James G. March. With contributions by G.
HD45 .P4
The theory of the growth of the firm.
HD58.7 .D96 2001
Dynamics of organizations : computational modeling and organization theories / edited by Alessandro
HD58.7 .J463 1998
Foundations of organizational strategy / Michael C. Jensen.
HD70.U5 C5
Strategy and structure : chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise / Alfred D. Chandler,
HD9000.5 .A37 1996
Agricultural markets : mechanisms, failures, and regulations / edited by David Martimort.
HD9710.U52 C38
Giant enterprise: Ford, General Motors, and the automobile industry; sources and readings.
HF1414 .C456 2000
From Adam Smith to Michael Porter : evolution of competitiveness theory / Dong-Sung Cho, Hwy-Chang M
HF1414 .P67 1998
On competition / Michael E. Porter.
HF5686.C8 S644
Studies in costing. Edited on behalf of the Association of University Teachers of Accounting by Davi
HG3761 .F36 2002
Famous fables of economics : myths of market failures / edited by Daniel F. Spulber.
K840 .B65 2005
Contract theory / Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont.
K840 .E28 2002
The economics of contracts : theories and applications / edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Gl
Tuesday, December 9, 2008
Papers: Hennessy, David A.
1.
Damage Control and Increasing Returns: Further Results Damage Control and Increasing Returns: Further Results
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 786-791
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
2.
The Taxpayer Relief Act, Estate Planning, and Resource Mobility in U.S. Agriculture The Taxpayer Relief Act, Estate Planning, and Resource Mobility in U.S. Agriculture
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, No. 3 (Aug., 1999), pp. 534-543
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
3.
Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Nov., 1996), pp. 1034-1043
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
4.
Competition, Externalities, and Input Substituting Technologies Competition, Externalities, and Input Substituting Technologies
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 84, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 467-481
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
5.
Microeconomics of Agricultural Grading: Impacts on the Marketing Channel Microeconomics of Agricultural Grading: Impacts on the Marketing Channel
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 980-989
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
6.
The Production Effects of Agricultural Income Support Policies under Uncertainty The Production Effects of Agricultural Income Support Policies under Uncertainty
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 46-57
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
7.
Input Decisions and Price-Quality Schedules Input Decisions and Price-Quality Schedules
David A. Hennessy
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jul., 1999), pp. 168-177
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
8.
The Economics of Purifying and Blending The Economics of Purifying and Blending
David A. Hennessy
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jul., 1996), pp. 223-232
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
9.
Technology Adoption and Welfare under a Monopoly: An Illustration of Microeconomic Policy Analysis Technology Adoption and Welfare under a Monopoly: An Illustration of Microeconomic Policy Analysis
David A. Hennessy
The Journal of Economic Education, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 111-117
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
10.
Capturing Experts' Uncertainty in Welfare Analysis: An Application to Organophosphate Use Regulation in U.S. Apple Production Capturing Experts' Uncertainty in Welfare Analysis: An Application to Organophosphate Use Regulation in U.S. Apple Production
Jutta Roosen, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 166-182
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
11.
Quality Premiums and the Firm's Production Decision Quality Premiums and the Firm's Production Decision
David A. Hennessy, Stephen Devadoss
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 107-115
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
12.
Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Aug., 2007), pp. 698-711
13.
On Monoculture and the Structure of Crop Rotations On Monoculture and the Structure of Crop Rotations
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Nov., 2006), pp. 900-914
14.
Slaughterhouse Rules: Animal Uniformity and Regulating for Food Safety in Meat Packing Slaughterhouse Rules: Animal Uniformity and Regulating for Food Safety in Meat Packing
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Aug., 2005), pp. 600-609
15.
Cost-Effective Hazard Control in Food Handling Cost-Effective Hazard Control in Food Handling
John A. Fox, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, No. 2 (May, 1999), pp. 359-372
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
16.
Input Demand under Yield and Revenue Insurance Input Demand under Yield and Revenue Insurance
Bruce A. Babcock, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 78, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 416-427
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
17.
The Effects of Decision Making on Futures Price Volatility The Effects of Decision Making on Futures Price Volatility
David A. Hennessy, Thomas I. Wahl
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp. 591-603
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
18.
Planting Decisions and Uncertain Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Crop Varieties Planting Decisions and Uncertain Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Crop Varieties
Alexander E. Saak, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 84, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 308-319
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
19.
Contractual Relations, Control, and Quality in the Hog Sector Contractual Relations, Control, and Quality in the Hog Sector
David A. Hennessy, John D. Lawrence
Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring - Summer, 1999), pp. 52-67
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
20.
Competition and Tying in Agrichemical and Seed Markets Competition and Tying in Agrichemical and Seed Markets
David A. Hennessy, Dermot J. Hayes
Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn - Winter, 2000), pp. 389-406
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
21.
Tests for the Role of Risk Aversion on Input Use Tests for the Role of Risk Aversion on Input Use
Jutta Roosen, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 30-43
22.
Regulatory Actions under Adjustment Costs and the Resolution of Scientific Uncertainty Regulatory Actions under Adjustment Costs and the Resolution of Scientific Uncertainty
David A. Hennessy, GianCarlo Moschini
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 88, No. 2 (May, 2006), pp. 308-323
23.
Budgetary and Producer Welfare Effects of Revenue Insurance Budgetary and Producer Welfare Effects of Revenue Insurance
David A. Hennessy, Bruce A. Babcock, Dermot J. Hayes
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 1024-1034
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
24.
Leadership and the Provision of Safe Food Leadership and the Provision of Safe Food
David A. Hennessy, Jutta Roosen, John A. Miranowski
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Nov., 2001), pp. 862-874
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
25.
Genetic Information in Agricultural Productivity and Product Development Genetic Information in Agricultural Productivity and Product Development
David A. Hennessy, John A. Miranowski, Bruce A. Babcock
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 73-87
26.
Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal Production Systems Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal Production Systems
David A. Hennessy, Jutta Roosen, Helen H. Jensen
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Nov., 2005), pp. 900-917
Damage Control and Increasing Returns: Further Results Damage Control and Increasing Returns: Further Results
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 786-791
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
2.
The Taxpayer Relief Act, Estate Planning, and Resource Mobility in U.S. Agriculture The Taxpayer Relief Act, Estate Planning, and Resource Mobility in U.S. Agriculture
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, No. 3 (Aug., 1999), pp. 534-543
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
3.
Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Nov., 1996), pp. 1034-1043
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
4.
Competition, Externalities, and Input Substituting Technologies Competition, Externalities, and Input Substituting Technologies
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 84, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 467-481
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
5.
Microeconomics of Agricultural Grading: Impacts on the Marketing Channel Microeconomics of Agricultural Grading: Impacts on the Marketing Channel
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 980-989
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
6.
The Production Effects of Agricultural Income Support Policies under Uncertainty The Production Effects of Agricultural Income Support Policies under Uncertainty
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 46-57
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
7.
Input Decisions and Price-Quality Schedules Input Decisions and Price-Quality Schedules
David A. Hennessy
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jul., 1999), pp. 168-177
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
8.
The Economics of Purifying and Blending The Economics of Purifying and Blending
David A. Hennessy
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jul., 1996), pp. 223-232
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
9.
Technology Adoption and Welfare under a Monopoly: An Illustration of Microeconomic Policy Analysis Technology Adoption and Welfare under a Monopoly: An Illustration of Microeconomic Policy Analysis
David A. Hennessy
The Journal of Economic Education, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 111-117
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
10.
Capturing Experts' Uncertainty in Welfare Analysis: An Application to Organophosphate Use Regulation in U.S. Apple Production Capturing Experts' Uncertainty in Welfare Analysis: An Application to Organophosphate Use Regulation in U.S. Apple Production
Jutta Roosen, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 166-182
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
11.
Quality Premiums and the Firm's Production Decision Quality Premiums and the Firm's Production Decision
David A. Hennessy, Stephen Devadoss
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 107-115
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
12.
Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Aug., 2007), pp. 698-711
13.
On Monoculture and the Structure of Crop Rotations On Monoculture and the Structure of Crop Rotations
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Nov., 2006), pp. 900-914
14.
Slaughterhouse Rules: Animal Uniformity and Regulating for Food Safety in Meat Packing Slaughterhouse Rules: Animal Uniformity and Regulating for Food Safety in Meat Packing
David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Aug., 2005), pp. 600-609
15.
Cost-Effective Hazard Control in Food Handling Cost-Effective Hazard Control in Food Handling
John A. Fox, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, No. 2 (May, 1999), pp. 359-372
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
16.
Input Demand under Yield and Revenue Insurance Input Demand under Yield and Revenue Insurance
Bruce A. Babcock, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 78, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 416-427
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
17.
The Effects of Decision Making on Futures Price Volatility The Effects of Decision Making on Futures Price Volatility
David A. Hennessy, Thomas I. Wahl
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp. 591-603
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
18.
Planting Decisions and Uncertain Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Crop Varieties Planting Decisions and Uncertain Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Crop Varieties
Alexander E. Saak, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 84, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 308-319
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
19.
Contractual Relations, Control, and Quality in the Hog Sector Contractual Relations, Control, and Quality in the Hog Sector
David A. Hennessy, John D. Lawrence
Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring - Summer, 1999), pp. 52-67
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
20.
Competition and Tying in Agrichemical and Seed Markets Competition and Tying in Agrichemical and Seed Markets
David A. Hennessy, Dermot J. Hayes
Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn - Winter, 2000), pp. 389-406
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
21.
Tests for the Role of Risk Aversion on Input Use Tests for the Role of Risk Aversion on Input Use
Jutta Roosen, David A. Hennessy
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 30-43
22.
Regulatory Actions under Adjustment Costs and the Resolution of Scientific Uncertainty Regulatory Actions under Adjustment Costs and the Resolution of Scientific Uncertainty
David A. Hennessy, GianCarlo Moschini
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 88, No. 2 (May, 2006), pp. 308-323
23.
Budgetary and Producer Welfare Effects of Revenue Insurance Budgetary and Producer Welfare Effects of Revenue Insurance
David A. Hennessy, Bruce A. Babcock, Dermot J. Hayes
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 1024-1034
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
24.
Leadership and the Provision of Safe Food Leadership and the Provision of Safe Food
David A. Hennessy, Jutta Roosen, John A. Miranowski
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Nov., 2001), pp. 862-874
Article Information Page of First Match PDF Export this Citation
25.
Genetic Information in Agricultural Productivity and Product Development Genetic Information in Agricultural Productivity and Product Development
David A. Hennessy, John A. Miranowski, Bruce A. Babcock
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 73-87
26.
Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal Production Systems Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal Production Systems
David A. Hennessy, Jutta Roosen, Helen H. Jensen
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Nov., 2005), pp. 900-917
Basic problem in Firm theory
1) existence of the firm
why do firm exist?
2) Boundaries of the firm
what determines the boundaries of the firm
3) Internal organization
how are firms organized internally
why do firm exist?
2) Boundaries of the firm
what determines the boundaries of the firm
3) Internal organization
how are firms organized internally
property right, related resource
come from: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Alchian.html
Related CEE Articles:
Austrian School of Economics
Discrimination
Labor Unions
Profits
Property Rights
Related CEE Biographies:
Ronald H. Coase
William F. Sharpe
Related Econlib Resources:
Walter Williams on Life, Liberty and Economics EconTalk Podcast with anecdotes by Walter E. Williams, student of Alchian's
Related Outside Resources:
Biography of Armen A. Alchian at UCLA
come from: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html
Related CEE Articles:
Capitalism
Competition
Corporations
Demand
Discrimination
Innovation
Insurance
Liability
Price Controls
Profits
Rent Control
Savings and Loan Crisis
Socialism
Tragedy of the Commons
Related CEE Biographies:
Armen A. Alchian
Related Econlib Resources:
Property Rights. High School Economics Topics
Karol Boudreaux on Wildlife, Property, and Poverty in Africa. EconTalk podcast, Sept. 22, 2008.
come from: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Coase.html
Related CEE Articles:
Austrian School of Economics
Externalities
Free Market
Information
Law and Economics
Liability
Property Rights
Public Goods
Telecommunications
Related CEE Biographies:
Armen A. Alchian
Milton Friedman
Arthur Cecil Pigou
Vernon L. Smith
Related CEE Articles:
Austrian School of Economics
Discrimination
Labor Unions
Profits
Property Rights
Related CEE Biographies:
Ronald H. Coase
William F. Sharpe
Related Econlib Resources:
Walter Williams on Life, Liberty and Economics EconTalk Podcast with anecdotes by Walter E. Williams, student of Alchian's
Related Outside Resources:
Biography of Armen A. Alchian at UCLA
come from: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html
Related CEE Articles:
Capitalism
Competition
Corporations
Demand
Discrimination
Innovation
Insurance
Liability
Price Controls
Profits
Rent Control
Savings and Loan Crisis
Socialism
Tragedy of the Commons
Related CEE Biographies:
Armen A. Alchian
Related Econlib Resources:
Property Rights. High School Economics Topics
Karol Boudreaux on Wildlife, Property, and Poverty in Africa. EconTalk podcast, Sept. 22, 2008.
come from: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Coase.html
Related CEE Articles:
Austrian School of Economics
Externalities
Free Market
Information
Law and Economics
Liability
Property Rights
Public Goods
Telecommunications
Related CEE Biographies:
Armen A. Alchian
Milton Friedman
Arthur Cecil Pigou
Vernon L. Smith
Property Rights, by Armen A. Alchian
come from: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html
Property Rights
by Armen A. Alchian
About the Author
Property Rights
One of the most fundamental requirements of a capitalist economic system—and one of the most misunderstood concepts—is a strong system of property rights. For decades social critics in the United States and throughout the Western world have complained that “property” rights too often take precedence over “human” rights, with the result that people are treated unequally and have unequal opportunities. Inequality exists in any society. But the purported conflict between property rights and human rights is a mirage. Property rights are human rights.
The definition, allocation, and protection of property rights comprise one of the most complex and difficult sets of issues that any society has to resolve, but one that must be resolved in some fashion. For the most part, social critics of “property” rights do not want to abolish those rights. Rather, they want to transfer them from private ownership to government ownership. Some transfers to public ownership (or control, which is similar) make an economy more effective. Others make it less effective. The worst outcome by far occurs when property rights really are abolished (see tragedy of the commons).
A property right is the exclusive authority to determine how a resource is used, whether that resource is owned by government or by individuals. Society approves the uses selected by the holder of the property right with governmental administered force and with social ostracism. If the resource is owned by the government, the agent who determines its use has to operate under a set of rules determined, in the United States, by Congress or by executive agencies it has charged with that role.
Private property rights have two other attributes in addition to determining the use of a resource. One is the exclusive right to the services of the resource. Thus, for example, the owner of an apartment with complete property rights to the apartment has the right to determine whether to rent it out and, if so, which tenant to rent to; to live in it himself; or to use it in any other peaceful way. That is the right to determine the use. If the owner rents out the apartment, he also has the right to all the rental income from the property. That is the right to the services of the resources (the rent).
Finally, a private property right includes the right to delegate, rent, or sell any portion of the rights by exchange or gift at whatever price the owner determines (provided someone is willing to pay that price). If I am not allowed to buy some rights from you and you therefore are not allowed to sell rights to me, private property rights are reduced. Thus, the three basic elements of private property are (1) exclusivity of rights to choose the use of a resource, (2) exclusivity of rights to the services of a resource, and (3) rights to exchange the resource at mutually agreeable terms.
The U.S. Supreme Court has vacillated about this third aspect of property rights. But no matter what words the justices use to rationalize such decisions, the fact is that such limitations as price controls and restrictions on the right to sell at mutually agreeable terms are reductions of private property rights. Many economists (myself included) believe that most such restrictions on property rights are detrimental to society. Here are some of the reasons why.
Under a private property system the market values of property reflect the preferences and demands of the rest of society. No matter who the owner is, the use of the resource is influenced by what the rest of the public thinks is the most valuable use. The reason is that an owner who chooses some other use must forsake that highest-valued use—and the price others would pay him for the resource or for the use of it. This creates an interesting paradox: although property is called “private,” private decisions are based on public, or social, evaluation.
The fundamental purpose of property rights, and their fundamental accomplishment, is that they eliminate destructive competition for control of economic resources. Well-defined and well-protected property rights replace competition by violence with competition by peaceful means.
The extent and degree of private property rights fundamentally affect the ways people compete for control of resources. With more complete private property rights, market exchange values become more influential. The personal status and personal attributes of people competing for a resource matter less because their influence can be offset by adjusting the price. In other words, more complete property rights make discrimination more costly. Consider the case of a black woman who wants to rent an apartment from a white landlord. She is better able to do so when the landlord has the right to set the rent at whatever level he wants. Even if the landlord would prefer a white tenant, the black woman can offset her disadvantage by offering a higher rent. A landlord who takes the white tenant at a lower rent anyway pays for discriminating.
But if the government imposes rent controls that keep the rent below the free-market level, the price the landlord pays to discriminate falls, possibly to zero. The rent control does not magically reduce the demand for apartments. Instead, it reduces every potential tenant’s ability to compete by offering more money. The landlord, now unable to receive the full money price, will discriminate in favor of tenants whose personal characteristics—such as age, sex, ethnicity, and religion—he favors. Now the black woman seeking an apartment cannot offset the disadvantage of her skin color by offering to pay a higher rent.
Competition for apartments is not eliminated by rent controls. What changes is the “coinage” of competition. The restriction on private property rights reduces competition based on monetary exchanges for goods and services and increases competition based on personal characteristics. More generally, weakening private property rights increases the role of personal characteristics in inducing sellers to discriminate among competing buyers and buyers to discriminate among sellers.
The two extremes in weakened private property rights are socialism and “commonly owned” resources. Under socialism, government agents—those whom the government assigns—exercise control over resources. The rights of these agents to make decisions about the property they control are highly restricted. People who think they can put the resources to more valuable uses cannot do so by purchasing the rights because the rights are not for sale at any price. Because socialist managers do not gain when the values of the resources they manage increase, and do not lose when the values fall, they have little incentive to heed changes in market-revealed values. The uses of resources are therefore more influenced by the personal characteristics and features of the officials who control them. Consider the socialist manager of a collective farm under the old Soviet communist system. By working every night for one week, he could have made, say, one million rubles of additional profit for the farm by arranging to transport the farm’s wheat to Moscow before it rotted. But because neither the manager nor those who worked on the farm were entitled to keep even a portion of this additional profit, the manager was more likely than the manager of a capitalist farm to go home early and let the crops rot.
Similarly, common ownership of resources—whether in the former Soviet Union or in the United States—gives no one a strong incentive to preserve the resource. A fishery that no one owns, for example, will be overfished. The reason is that a fisherman who throws back small fish to wait until they grow is unlikely to get any benefit from his waiting. Instead, some other fisherman will catch the fish. The same holds true for other common resources whether they be herds of buffalo, oil in the ground, or clean air. All will be overused.
Indeed, a main reason for the spectacular failure of the 1980s and early 1990s economic reforms in the former Soviet Union is that resources were shifted from ownership by government to de facto common ownership. How? By making the Soviet government’s revenues de facto into a common resource. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, who advised the Soviet government, once pointed out that when Soviet managers of socialist enterprises were allowed to open their own businesses but still were left as managers of the government’s businesses, they siphoned out the profits of the government’s business into their private corporations. Thousands of managers doing this caused a large budget deficit for the Soviet government. In this case the resource that no manager had an incentive to conserve was the Soviet government’s revenues. Similarly, improperly set premiums for U.S. deposit insurance gave banks and S&Ls (see savings and loan crisis) an incentive to make excessively risky loans and to treat the deposit insurance fund as a “common” resource.
Private property rights to a resource need not be held by a single person. They can be shared, with each person sharing in a specified fraction of the market value while decisions about uses are made in whatever process the sharing group deems desirable. A major example of such shared property rights is the corporation. In a limited liability corporation, shares are specified and the rights to decide how to use the corporation’s resources are delegated to its management. Each shareholder has the unrestrained right to sell his or her share. Limited liability insulates each shareholder’s wealth from the liabilities of other shareholders, and thereby facilitates anonymous sale and purchase of shares.
In other types of enterprises, especially where each member’s wealth will become uniquely dependent on each other member’s behavior, property rights in the group endeavor are usually salable only if existing members approve of the buyer. This is typical for what are often called joint ventures, “mutuals,” and partnerships.
While more complete property rights are preferable to less complete rights, any system of property rights entails considerable complexity and many issues that are difficult to resolve. If I operate a factory that emits smoke, foul smells, or airborne acids over your land, am I using your land without your permission? This is difficult to answer.
The cost of establishing private property rights—so that I could pay you a mutually agreeable price to pollute your air—may be too high. Air, underground water, and electromagnetic radiation, for example, are expensive to monitor and control. Therefore, a person does not effectively have enforceable private property rights to the quality and condition of some parcel of air. The inability to cost-effectively monitor and police uses of your resources means “your” property rights over “your” land are not as extensive and strong as they are over some other resources such as furniture, shoes, or automobiles. When private property rights are unavailable or too costly to establish and enforce, substitute means of control are sought. Government authority, expressed by government agents, is one very common such means. Hence the creation of environmental laws.
Depending on circumstances, certain actions may be considered invasions of privacy, trespass, or torts. If I seek refuge and safety for my boat at your dock during a sudden severe storm on a lake, have I invaded “your” property rights, or do your rights not include the right to prevent that use? The complexities and varieties of circumstances render impossible a bright-line definition of a person’s set of property rights with respect to resources.
Similarly, the set of resources over which property rights may be held is not well defined and demarcated. Ideas, melodies, and procedures, for example, are almost costless to replicate explicitly (near-zero cost of production) and implicitly (no forsaken other uses of the inputs). As a result, they typically are not protected as private property except for a fixed term of years under a patent or copyright.
Private property rights are not absolute. The rule against the “dead hand,” or perpetuities, is an example. I cannot specify how resources that I own will be used in the indefinitely distant future. Under our legal system, I can specify the use only for a limited number of years after my death or the deaths of currently living people. I cannot insulate a resource’s use from the influence of market values of all future generations. Society recognizes market prices as measures of the relative desirability of resource uses. Only to the extent that rights are salable are those values most fully revealed.
Accompanying and conflicting with the desire to secure private property rights for oneself is the desire to acquire more wealth by “taking” from others. This is done by military conquest and by forcible reallocation of rights to resources (also known as stealing). But such coercion is antithetical to—rather than characteristic of—a system of private property rights. Forcible reallocation means that the existing rights have not been adequately protected.
Private property rights do not conflict with human rights. They are human rights. Private property rights are the rights of humans to use specified goods and to exchange them. Any restraint on private property rights shifts the balance of power from impersonal attributes toward personal attributes and toward behavior that political authorities approve. That is a fundamental reason for preference of a system of strong private property rights: private property rights protect individual liberty.
Property Rights for “Sesame Street”
Janet Beales Kaidantzis
Ever seen two children quarreling over a toy? Such squabbles had been commonplace in Katherine Hussman Klemp’s household. But in the Sesame Street Parent’s Guide she tells how she created peace in her family of eight children by assigning property rights to toys.
As a young mother, Klemp often brought home games and toys from garage sales. “I rarely matched a particular item with a particular child,” she says. “Upon reflection, I could see how the fuzziness of ownership easily led to arguments. If everything belonged to everyone, then each child felt he had a right to use anything.”
To solve the problem, Klemp introduced two simple rules: First, never bring anything into the house without assigning clear ownership to one child. The owner has ultimate authority over the use of the property. Second, the owner is not required to share. Before the rules were in place, Klemp recalls, “I suspected that much of the drama often centered less on who got the item in dispute and more on whom Mom would side with.” Now, property rights, not parents, settle the arguments.
Instead of teaching selfishness, the introduction of property rights actually promoted sharing. The children were secure in their ownership and knew they could always get their toys back. Adds Klemp, “‘Sharing’ raised their self-esteem to see themselves as generous persons.”
Not only do her children value their own property rights, but also they extend that respect to the property of others. “Rarely do our children use each other’s things without asking first, and they respect a ‘No’ when they get one. Best of all, when someone who has every right to say ‘No’ to a request says ‘Yes,’ the borrower sees the gift for what it is and says ‘Thanks’ more often than not,” says Klemp.
About the Author
Armen A. Alchian is an emeritus professor of economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. Most of his major scientific contributions are in the economics of property rights.
Further Reading
Alchian, Armen. “Some Economics of Property Rights.” Il Politico 30 (1965): 816–829.
Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz. “The Property Rights Paradigm.” Journal of Economic History 33, no. 1 (1973): 16–27.
Demsetz, Harold. “When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?” Journal of Legal Studies 1 (January 1972): 13–28.
Sachs, Jeffrey. Interview. Omni (June 1991): 98.
Siegan, Bernard. Economic Liberties and the Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Property Rights
by Armen A. Alchian
About the Author
Property Rights
One of the most fundamental requirements of a capitalist economic system—and one of the most misunderstood concepts—is a strong system of property rights. For decades social critics in the United States and throughout the Western world have complained that “property” rights too often take precedence over “human” rights, with the result that people are treated unequally and have unequal opportunities. Inequality exists in any society. But the purported conflict between property rights and human rights is a mirage. Property rights are human rights.
The definition, allocation, and protection of property rights comprise one of the most complex and difficult sets of issues that any society has to resolve, but one that must be resolved in some fashion. For the most part, social critics of “property” rights do not want to abolish those rights. Rather, they want to transfer them from private ownership to government ownership. Some transfers to public ownership (or control, which is similar) make an economy more effective. Others make it less effective. The worst outcome by far occurs when property rights really are abolished (see tragedy of the commons).
A property right is the exclusive authority to determine how a resource is used, whether that resource is owned by government or by individuals. Society approves the uses selected by the holder of the property right with governmental administered force and with social ostracism. If the resource is owned by the government, the agent who determines its use has to operate under a set of rules determined, in the United States, by Congress or by executive agencies it has charged with that role.
Private property rights have two other attributes in addition to determining the use of a resource. One is the exclusive right to the services of the resource. Thus, for example, the owner of an apartment with complete property rights to the apartment has the right to determine whether to rent it out and, if so, which tenant to rent to; to live in it himself; or to use it in any other peaceful way. That is the right to determine the use. If the owner rents out the apartment, he also has the right to all the rental income from the property. That is the right to the services of the resources (the rent).
Finally, a private property right includes the right to delegate, rent, or sell any portion of the rights by exchange or gift at whatever price the owner determines (provided someone is willing to pay that price). If I am not allowed to buy some rights from you and you therefore are not allowed to sell rights to me, private property rights are reduced. Thus, the three basic elements of private property are (1) exclusivity of rights to choose the use of a resource, (2) exclusivity of rights to the services of a resource, and (3) rights to exchange the resource at mutually agreeable terms.
The U.S. Supreme Court has vacillated about this third aspect of property rights. But no matter what words the justices use to rationalize such decisions, the fact is that such limitations as price controls and restrictions on the right to sell at mutually agreeable terms are reductions of private property rights. Many economists (myself included) believe that most such restrictions on property rights are detrimental to society. Here are some of the reasons why.
Under a private property system the market values of property reflect the preferences and demands of the rest of society. No matter who the owner is, the use of the resource is influenced by what the rest of the public thinks is the most valuable use. The reason is that an owner who chooses some other use must forsake that highest-valued use—and the price others would pay him for the resource or for the use of it. This creates an interesting paradox: although property is called “private,” private decisions are based on public, or social, evaluation.
The fundamental purpose of property rights, and their fundamental accomplishment, is that they eliminate destructive competition for control of economic resources. Well-defined and well-protected property rights replace competition by violence with competition by peaceful means.
The extent and degree of private property rights fundamentally affect the ways people compete for control of resources. With more complete private property rights, market exchange values become more influential. The personal status and personal attributes of people competing for a resource matter less because their influence can be offset by adjusting the price. In other words, more complete property rights make discrimination more costly. Consider the case of a black woman who wants to rent an apartment from a white landlord. She is better able to do so when the landlord has the right to set the rent at whatever level he wants. Even if the landlord would prefer a white tenant, the black woman can offset her disadvantage by offering a higher rent. A landlord who takes the white tenant at a lower rent anyway pays for discriminating.
But if the government imposes rent controls that keep the rent below the free-market level, the price the landlord pays to discriminate falls, possibly to zero. The rent control does not magically reduce the demand for apartments. Instead, it reduces every potential tenant’s ability to compete by offering more money. The landlord, now unable to receive the full money price, will discriminate in favor of tenants whose personal characteristics—such as age, sex, ethnicity, and religion—he favors. Now the black woman seeking an apartment cannot offset the disadvantage of her skin color by offering to pay a higher rent.
Competition for apartments is not eliminated by rent controls. What changes is the “coinage” of competition. The restriction on private property rights reduces competition based on monetary exchanges for goods and services and increases competition based on personal characteristics. More generally, weakening private property rights increases the role of personal characteristics in inducing sellers to discriminate among competing buyers and buyers to discriminate among sellers.
The two extremes in weakened private property rights are socialism and “commonly owned” resources. Under socialism, government agents—those whom the government assigns—exercise control over resources. The rights of these agents to make decisions about the property they control are highly restricted. People who think they can put the resources to more valuable uses cannot do so by purchasing the rights because the rights are not for sale at any price. Because socialist managers do not gain when the values of the resources they manage increase, and do not lose when the values fall, they have little incentive to heed changes in market-revealed values. The uses of resources are therefore more influenced by the personal characteristics and features of the officials who control them. Consider the socialist manager of a collective farm under the old Soviet communist system. By working every night for one week, he could have made, say, one million rubles of additional profit for the farm by arranging to transport the farm’s wheat to Moscow before it rotted. But because neither the manager nor those who worked on the farm were entitled to keep even a portion of this additional profit, the manager was more likely than the manager of a capitalist farm to go home early and let the crops rot.
Similarly, common ownership of resources—whether in the former Soviet Union or in the United States—gives no one a strong incentive to preserve the resource. A fishery that no one owns, for example, will be overfished. The reason is that a fisherman who throws back small fish to wait until they grow is unlikely to get any benefit from his waiting. Instead, some other fisherman will catch the fish. The same holds true for other common resources whether they be herds of buffalo, oil in the ground, or clean air. All will be overused.
Indeed, a main reason for the spectacular failure of the 1980s and early 1990s economic reforms in the former Soviet Union is that resources were shifted from ownership by government to de facto common ownership. How? By making the Soviet government’s revenues de facto into a common resource. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, who advised the Soviet government, once pointed out that when Soviet managers of socialist enterprises were allowed to open their own businesses but still were left as managers of the government’s businesses, they siphoned out the profits of the government’s business into their private corporations. Thousands of managers doing this caused a large budget deficit for the Soviet government. In this case the resource that no manager had an incentive to conserve was the Soviet government’s revenues. Similarly, improperly set premiums for U.S. deposit insurance gave banks and S&Ls (see savings and loan crisis) an incentive to make excessively risky loans and to treat the deposit insurance fund as a “common” resource.
Private property rights to a resource need not be held by a single person. They can be shared, with each person sharing in a specified fraction of the market value while decisions about uses are made in whatever process the sharing group deems desirable. A major example of such shared property rights is the corporation. In a limited liability corporation, shares are specified and the rights to decide how to use the corporation’s resources are delegated to its management. Each shareholder has the unrestrained right to sell his or her share. Limited liability insulates each shareholder’s wealth from the liabilities of other shareholders, and thereby facilitates anonymous sale and purchase of shares.
In other types of enterprises, especially where each member’s wealth will become uniquely dependent on each other member’s behavior, property rights in the group endeavor are usually salable only if existing members approve of the buyer. This is typical for what are often called joint ventures, “mutuals,” and partnerships.
While more complete property rights are preferable to less complete rights, any system of property rights entails considerable complexity and many issues that are difficult to resolve. If I operate a factory that emits smoke, foul smells, or airborne acids over your land, am I using your land without your permission? This is difficult to answer.
The cost of establishing private property rights—so that I could pay you a mutually agreeable price to pollute your air—may be too high. Air, underground water, and electromagnetic radiation, for example, are expensive to monitor and control. Therefore, a person does not effectively have enforceable private property rights to the quality and condition of some parcel of air. The inability to cost-effectively monitor and police uses of your resources means “your” property rights over “your” land are not as extensive and strong as they are over some other resources such as furniture, shoes, or automobiles. When private property rights are unavailable or too costly to establish and enforce, substitute means of control are sought. Government authority, expressed by government agents, is one very common such means. Hence the creation of environmental laws.
Depending on circumstances, certain actions may be considered invasions of privacy, trespass, or torts. If I seek refuge and safety for my boat at your dock during a sudden severe storm on a lake, have I invaded “your” property rights, or do your rights not include the right to prevent that use? The complexities and varieties of circumstances render impossible a bright-line definition of a person’s set of property rights with respect to resources.
Similarly, the set of resources over which property rights may be held is not well defined and demarcated. Ideas, melodies, and procedures, for example, are almost costless to replicate explicitly (near-zero cost of production) and implicitly (no forsaken other uses of the inputs). As a result, they typically are not protected as private property except for a fixed term of years under a patent or copyright.
Private property rights are not absolute. The rule against the “dead hand,” or perpetuities, is an example. I cannot specify how resources that I own will be used in the indefinitely distant future. Under our legal system, I can specify the use only for a limited number of years after my death or the deaths of currently living people. I cannot insulate a resource’s use from the influence of market values of all future generations. Society recognizes market prices as measures of the relative desirability of resource uses. Only to the extent that rights are salable are those values most fully revealed.
Accompanying and conflicting with the desire to secure private property rights for oneself is the desire to acquire more wealth by “taking” from others. This is done by military conquest and by forcible reallocation of rights to resources (also known as stealing). But such coercion is antithetical to—rather than characteristic of—a system of private property rights. Forcible reallocation means that the existing rights have not been adequately protected.
Private property rights do not conflict with human rights. They are human rights. Private property rights are the rights of humans to use specified goods and to exchange them. Any restraint on private property rights shifts the balance of power from impersonal attributes toward personal attributes and toward behavior that political authorities approve. That is a fundamental reason for preference of a system of strong private property rights: private property rights protect individual liberty.
Property Rights for “Sesame Street”
Janet Beales Kaidantzis
Ever seen two children quarreling over a toy? Such squabbles had been commonplace in Katherine Hussman Klemp’s household. But in the Sesame Street Parent’s Guide she tells how she created peace in her family of eight children by assigning property rights to toys.
As a young mother, Klemp often brought home games and toys from garage sales. “I rarely matched a particular item with a particular child,” she says. “Upon reflection, I could see how the fuzziness of ownership easily led to arguments. If everything belonged to everyone, then each child felt he had a right to use anything.”
To solve the problem, Klemp introduced two simple rules: First, never bring anything into the house without assigning clear ownership to one child. The owner has ultimate authority over the use of the property. Second, the owner is not required to share. Before the rules were in place, Klemp recalls, “I suspected that much of the drama often centered less on who got the item in dispute and more on whom Mom would side with.” Now, property rights, not parents, settle the arguments.
Instead of teaching selfishness, the introduction of property rights actually promoted sharing. The children were secure in their ownership and knew they could always get their toys back. Adds Klemp, “‘Sharing’ raised their self-esteem to see themselves as generous persons.”
Not only do her children value their own property rights, but also they extend that respect to the property of others. “Rarely do our children use each other’s things without asking first, and they respect a ‘No’ when they get one. Best of all, when someone who has every right to say ‘No’ to a request says ‘Yes,’ the borrower sees the gift for what it is and says ‘Thanks’ more often than not,” says Klemp.
About the Author
Armen A. Alchian is an emeritus professor of economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. Most of his major scientific contributions are in the economics of property rights.
Further Reading
Alchian, Armen. “Some Economics of Property Rights.” Il Politico 30 (1965): 816–829.
Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz. “The Property Rights Paradigm.” Journal of Economic History 33, no. 1 (1973): 16–27.
Demsetz, Harold. “When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?” Journal of Legal Studies 1 (January 1972): 13–28.
Sachs, Jeffrey. Interview. Omni (June 1991): 98.
Siegan, Bernard. Economic Liberties and the Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
intro: Alchian, Armen A. 1914
http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/General/ALCHIAN.HTM
Armen A. Alchian
Emeritus Professor
Department of Economics
UCLA
Armen Alchian was born on April 12, 1914 in Fresno, California. In 1932 he attended Fresno State College, and transferred to Stanford in 1934. He obtained his B.A. from Stanford in 1936. He continued at Stanford as a graduate student, finishing his Ph.D. dissertation on "The Effects of Changes in the General Wage Structure" in 1943. In 1940-41 he was at the NBER and Harvard, and in 1942 he was an instructor at the University of Oregon. He served in the U.S. Army Air Forces from 1942-46 doing statistical work. He arrived at UCLA in 1946, becoming associated with RAND at the same time. He became a full professor at UCLA in 1958. He as received numerous awards and honors over the years, and became a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association in 1996.
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Alchian.html
Armen A. Alchian
Emeritus Professor
Department of Economics
UCLA
Armen Alchian was born on April 12, 1914 in Fresno, California. In 1932 he attended Fresno State College, and transferred to Stanford in 1934. He obtained his B.A. from Stanford in 1936. He continued at Stanford as a graduate student, finishing his Ph.D. dissertation on "The Effects of Changes in the General Wage Structure" in 1943. In 1940-41 he was at the NBER and Harvard, and in 1942 he was an instructor at the University of Oregon. He served in the U.S. Army Air Forces from 1942-46 doing statistical work. He arrived at UCLA in 1946, becoming associated with RAND at the same time. He became a full professor at UCLA in 1958. He as received numerous awards and honors over the years, and became a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association in 1996.
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Alchian.html
Sunday, December 7, 2008
liter. Williamson, Oliver E.
http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/bpp/oew/index.html
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=22011
Williamson, O., 1967. Hierarchical control and optimum firm size. Journal of Political Economy 75, 123–138.
Williamson, O., 1971.The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, May 1971, 61, 112‑23.
Williamson, O., 1973. Markets and hierarchies: some elementary considerations. American Economic Review 63,316–325.
Williamson, O., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press, New York, NY.
Oliver E. Williamson, Michael Wachter and Jeffrey Harris.1975.Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange," The Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1975, 6, 250‑78.
Williamson, O., 1976.Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies ‑‑ in General and with Respect to CATV," The Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1976, 7, 73‑104.
Williamson, O., 1977.Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis," Yale Law Journal, December 1977, 87, 284‑340.
Williamson, O., 1979. Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law andEconomics 22, 233–261.
Williamson, O., 1981.The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes. Journal of Economic Literature, December 1981, 19, 1537‑1568.
Williamson, O., 1983.Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange. American Economic Review, September 1983, 73, 519‑40.
Williamson, O., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York, NY.
Michael Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson.1985.Asset Specificity and Economic Organization. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1985, 3, 365‑78.
Williamson, O.,1988.Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance.Journal of Finance, July 1988, 43, 567‑91.
Williamson, O.,1991.Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives" Administrative Science Quarterly 36 (2), June 1991, 269-296.
Williamson, O.,1991.Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization," Strategic Management Journal, Winter 1991, 12, 75‑94.
Williamson, O.,1991.Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7 January 1991, 159-187.
Williamson, O.,1993.Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization,Journal of Law and Economics, 36 (1), April 1993, 453-486.
Williamson, O., 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Williamson, O., 1996"Revisiting Legal Realism: The Law, Economics, and Organization Perspective," Industrial and Corporate Change, 5 (2), 1996, 383‑420.
Williamson, O.,1998.Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it is Headed Show Abstract Hide Abstract
De Economist, Vol. 146, No. 3, 1998.Accepted Paper Series Oliver E. WilliamsonUniversity of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy GroupPosted:06 Oct 98 Last Revised: 15 Feb 01
Williamson, O., 1999.Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective,Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (1), March 1999, 306-342.
Williamson, O., 1999.Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspectives,?Strategic Management Journal, 20 (12), December 1999, 1087-1108.
Williamson, O.,1999.Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective Download
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 1999 Accepted Paper Series University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group
Williamson, O., 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature38, 595–613.
Williamson, O., 2002.The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering,?American Economic Review, 92 (2) May 2002, 438-443.
Williamson, O., 2002. The theory of the firm as governance structure: from choice to contract. Journal of EconomicPerspectives 16, 171–195.
Williamson, O.2003.Examining Economic Organization Through the Lens of Contract,Industrial and Corporate Change 12 (4), August 2003, 917-942.
Williamson, O. 2005. "Why Law, Economics, and Organization?" Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1: 369-396.
Williamson, O.2005.The Economics of Governance,American Economic Review, 95 (2) May 2005, 1-18.
Williamson, O.,2005.Transaction Cost Economics and Business Administration,?Scandinavian Journal of Management, 21 (1), March 2005, 19-40.
Williamson, O.,2001 Why Law, Economics, and Organization? Download UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 37Working Paper Series University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy GroupPosted:12 Jan 01 Last Revised: 22 Jan 01
Working Papers
Williamson, O.,2006. Corporate Boards of Directors: A Dual Purpose (Efficiency) Perspective, unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
Steven Tadelis and Oliver E. Williamson, 2006. Transaction Cost Economics, unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
Williamson, O.,2006. Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction, unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
Williamson, O.,2008.Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice Download
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 247-272, 2008Accepted Paper Series
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group
Posted:16 Sep 08 Last Revised: 07 Oct 08
Williamson, O.,2008.Transaction Cost Economics: The Precursors Download
Economic Affairs, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 7-14, September 2008Accepted Paper Series
Oliver E. Williamson
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group
Posted:12 Sep 08 Last Revised: 12 Sep 08
treated: http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/bpp/oew/papers.htm
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=22011
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=22011
Williamson, O., 1967. Hierarchical control and optimum firm size. Journal of Political Economy 75, 123–138.
Williamson, O., 1971.The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, May 1971, 61, 112‑23.
Williamson, O., 1973. Markets and hierarchies: some elementary considerations. American Economic Review 63,316–325.
Williamson, O., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press, New York, NY.
Oliver E. Williamson, Michael Wachter and Jeffrey Harris.1975.Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange," The Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1975, 6, 250‑78.
Williamson, O., 1976.Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies ‑‑ in General and with Respect to CATV," The Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1976, 7, 73‑104.
Williamson, O., 1977.Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis," Yale Law Journal, December 1977, 87, 284‑340.
Williamson, O., 1979. Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law andEconomics 22, 233–261.
Williamson, O., 1981.The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes. Journal of Economic Literature, December 1981, 19, 1537‑1568.
Williamson, O., 1983.Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange. American Economic Review, September 1983, 73, 519‑40.
Williamson, O., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York, NY.
Michael Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson.1985.Asset Specificity and Economic Organization. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1985, 3, 365‑78.
Williamson, O.,1988.Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance.Journal of Finance, July 1988, 43, 567‑91.
Williamson, O.,1991.Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives" Administrative Science Quarterly 36 (2), June 1991, 269-296.
Williamson, O.,1991.Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization," Strategic Management Journal, Winter 1991, 12, 75‑94.
Williamson, O.,1991.Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7 January 1991, 159-187.
Williamson, O.,1993.Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization,Journal of Law and Economics, 36 (1), April 1993, 453-486.
Williamson, O., 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Williamson, O., 1996"Revisiting Legal Realism: The Law, Economics, and Organization Perspective," Industrial and Corporate Change, 5 (2), 1996, 383‑420.
Williamson, O.,1998.Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it is Headed Show Abstract Hide Abstract
De Economist, Vol. 146, No. 3, 1998.Accepted Paper Series Oliver E. WilliamsonUniversity of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy GroupPosted:06 Oct 98 Last Revised: 15 Feb 01
Williamson, O., 1999.Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective,Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (1), March 1999, 306-342.
Williamson, O., 1999.Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspectives,?Strategic Management Journal, 20 (12), December 1999, 1087-1108.
Williamson, O.,1999.Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective Download
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 1999 Accepted Paper Series University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group
Williamson, O., 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature38, 595–613.
Williamson, O., 2002.The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering,?American Economic Review, 92 (2) May 2002, 438-443.
Williamson, O., 2002. The theory of the firm as governance structure: from choice to contract. Journal of EconomicPerspectives 16, 171–195.
Williamson, O.2003.Examining Economic Organization Through the Lens of Contract,Industrial and Corporate Change 12 (4), August 2003, 917-942.
Williamson, O. 2005. "Why Law, Economics, and Organization?" Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1: 369-396.
Williamson, O.2005.The Economics of Governance,American Economic Review, 95 (2) May 2005, 1-18.
Williamson, O.,2005.Transaction Cost Economics and Business Administration,?Scandinavian Journal of Management, 21 (1), March 2005, 19-40.
Williamson, O.,2001 Why Law, Economics, and Organization? Download UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 37Working Paper Series University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy GroupPosted:12 Jan 01 Last Revised: 22 Jan 01
Working Papers
Williamson, O.,2006. Corporate Boards of Directors: A Dual Purpose (Efficiency) Perspective, unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
Steven Tadelis and Oliver E. Williamson, 2006. Transaction Cost Economics, unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
Williamson, O.,2006. Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction, unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
Williamson, O.,2008.Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice Download
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 247-272, 2008Accepted Paper Series
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group
Posted:16 Sep 08 Last Revised: 07 Oct 08
Williamson, O.,2008.Transaction Cost Economics: The Precursors Download
Economic Affairs, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 7-14, September 2008Accepted Paper Series
Oliver E. Williamson
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group
Posted:12 Sep 08 Last Revised: 12 Sep 08
treated: http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/bpp/oew/papers.htm
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=22011
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